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FOREWORD
As a region with abundant resources and rapidly
growing transit potential surrounded by nucleararmed powers, Central Asia is increasingly drawing
the attention of global players. Russia is actively seeking to rebuild its economic influence via the newly
created Eurasian Economic Union. China is expanding
its reach through a recently launched Silk Road Economic Belt. Other actors are jockeying for their share
of the region’s pie, as well. But the United States and
India are enjoying only very limited presence in what
is increasingly becoming a critical part of the world.
In this comprehensive and insightful account, Mr.
Roman Muzalevsky, an author of a book and several
monographs on global trends, great power politics,
grand strategy, and connectivity issues, explains
why India lags behind other actors in the region and
what needs to be done to unlock its potential as a rising great power and shore up its strategic presence
in Central Asia. The region, he argues, is of growing
importance for India’s expansion as an emerging continental power, and failure to enhance its footprint
risks delaying India’s global rise and undermining the
U.S. global agenda of upholding the global order amid
accelerating power shifts.
According to the author, a number of select elements of India’s strategic culture and geopolitical constraints have prevented Delhi from pursuing a more
active and effective regional policy. India’s legacy of
nonalignment, lost orientation, and inward focus following the collapse of the Soviet Union, among other factors, are, in part, responsible for the country’s
lack of clear direction, absence of a widely appealing
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model, and somewhat passive foreign policy that still
draws heavily on the outdated framework of India’s
nonalignment legacy as its baseline.
As if it were not enough, Mr. Muzalevsky contends
that India also confronts major geopolitical constraints
such as a disconnected Central-South Asian region,
instability and volatility in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
and tensions and border disputes with Beijing and Islamabad. China’s head start in undertaking economic
reforms and its perceived strategy of encirclement of
India have added further strains on India’s ambitions
to enhance its strategic profile in Central Asia. The
author approaches each of these issues with a critical
eye and through the prism of India’s relations with
individual Central Asian republics and great powers,
highlighting deficiencies of India’s overall approach
to the region and challenges and opportunities of its
“Connect Central Asia” policy. He argues that India
needs not only to compete but also cooperate with
its perceived rivals in the broader region, especially
China and Pakistan. Most importantly, however, Mr.
Muzalevsky calls for an explicit partnership between
the United States and India in the region, pointing to their overlapping agendas as part of the U.S.
New Silk Road Strategy and India’s “Connect Central
Asia” policy, which, in many ways, confront similar
constraints.
Mr. Muzalevsky treats the prospects of such partnership with caution, pointing to India’s disinterest in
power balancing schemes and proclivity for pursuing
a strictly independent course. He also highlights the
potential of this partnership to undermine U.S.-Russian and U.S.-Chinese relations and lead to escalation
of external rivalries in a region that is barely able to
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cope with internal ones. But the author also provides
compelling reasons for why such partnership is a
must if Delhi and Washington want to advance their
interests in and out of Central-South Asia. Neither of
these powers enjoys a substantial presence in the region, and each is poorly positioned to take advantage
of regional trends and opportunities to shape Russia’s, China’s, and Iran’s advances. Both, however, are
English-speaking democracies, concerned about the
future of Central-South Asia, given regional threats,
Russia’s resurgence, and China’s expansion. Both are
also seeking to reverse decades of separation between
Central and South Asia as part of their strategies.
The parties are already aligning their positions on
select issues and see a growing cooperation on strategic matters, including nuclear issues and privatization
and investment into the Indian economy. The author
makes an important caveat when discussing the prospects of such partnership in Central Asia, stating that
the United States and India can now start pursuing a
number of objectives, either in concert or separately,
to unlock each other’s strategic potential in the region
and beyond. Specifically, they should mitigate Afghanistan-Pakistan security challenges; shape Iran’s
geopolitical role; foster Sino-Indian cooperation; and
exploit grand strategies and regional connectivity initiatives of other players in Central-South Asia and the
Greater Middle East. But the author’s advice stands:
Delhi and Washington should partner to remain
relevant in the region.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer
this insightful policy guide to its audience of international relations professionals and policymakers working on issues ranging from U.S. and Indian policy in
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Central-South Asia to U.S.-Indian, Sino-Indian, and
Indo-Pakistani relations.
		
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
India’s impressive economic growth over the last
2 1/2 decades has brought India’s role and interests
to the forefront of global politics and statecraft. Importantly, it has put India into a comparative perspective with China, another aspiring Asian great power
poised to stiffen competition for resources and influence worldwide. Both are resource-hungry and rapidly emerging powers seeking a new place and role in
the global and regional orders. Both are also strategic
rivals and consider their immediate neighborhood of
Central Asia of growing strategic importance to their
grand strategies. For now, China has outperformed
India in Central Asia on all counts, securing the region
as a key resource base and platform for power projection. India launched the “Connect Central Asia” policy
in 2012 to shore up its presence, but the policy has not
yet secured for it even a remotely comparable stake in
the region due to aspects of India’s strategic culture
and geopolitical constraints. Meanwhile, U.S. strategic presence in the region leaves much to be desired.
The United States is withdrawing from Afghanistan
without major political or military gains from the conflict that has cost it and its partners a fortune in lives
and money. The future of its military infrastructure
and relationships with countries in Central-South Asia
is a big unknown, with regional partners equating the
U.S. military pullout with its waning commitment to
support the regional economic and security order.
To help unlock their strategic potentials, Delhi and
Washington should join forces and cultivate a strategic partnership that makes Central Asia its major pillar. Until then, neither Delhi nor Washington is likely
to succeed. Written in May 2015, this monograph
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examines related issues and proposes regional policy
recommendations for India and the United States.
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UNLOCKING INDIA’S STRATEGIC POTENTIAL
IN CENTRAL ASIA
INTRODUCTION
India’s impressive economic growth over the last
2 1/2 decades has brought India’s role and interests
in the world and Central-South Asia to the forefront
of global politics and statecraft. Importantly, it has
put India into a comparative perspective with China,
another aspiring Asian great power poised to stiffen
competition for resources and influence among established and emerging powers alike. Both are resourcehungry and rapidly emerging powers seeking a new
place and role in global and regional economic and
security orders. Both are also strategic rivals and consider their immediate neighborhood of Central Asia of
growing strategic importance to their grand strategies.
Just as China has viewed its westward expansion into
Central Asia imperative to acquire resources and project power globally, so has India deemed its northward
push into the region essential to nurture and expand
its potential as an aspiring global power.
For now, China has outperformed India in Central Asia on all counts, securing the region as a key
resource base and platform for power projection. In
2012, India launched the “Connect Central Asia” policy to shore up its presence, but the policy has not secured for it a stake comparable to other established or
emerging great powers due to geopolitical constraints
and aspects inherent in its strategic culture. Its go-italone approach has earned it little by way of global
influence or regional presence in Central-South Asia.
In the meantime, the rise of China and its perceived
strategy to encircle India have erected new barriers for
Delhi’s emergence as a great power.
1

Meanwhile, the U.S. strategic presence in the region leaves much to be desired. The United States is
withdrawing from Afghanistan without major political or military gains from the conflict that has cost it
and its partners a fortune in lives and money. The
future of its military infrastructure and relationships
with countries in Central-South Asia is a big unknown, with regional partners equating the U.S. military pullout with its waning commitment to support
the regional economic and security order. To help unlock their strategic potentials, Delhi and Washington
should join forces in Central Asia. Despite promising
signs, doing this is not going to be easy, given political
barriers, institutional mistrust, and past grievances of
both nations.
Whether India will rely on its own resources—to
be expanded with the rise of its economy—or seek a
partnership with the United States, or both, remains to
be seen. What is clear is that India’s geopolitical role
is set to expand considerably in the next years and
decades. Such expansion will generate concerns for
neighbors and distant actors alike, creating conditions
for instability despite benefits of cooperation between
them and India as one of the largest economies. Washington and Delhi should ensure they stay engaged in
Central Asia and enhance their positions amid a power struggle unfolding between outside powers in this
increasingly critical part of the world by mitigating
Afghanistan-Pakistan (Af-Pak) security challenges;
shaping Iran’s geopolitical role; fostering Sino-Indian
cooperation; and exploiting grand strategies and regional connectivity initiatives of other actors. This
they should achieve as part of a strategic partnership
that makes Central Asia its major pillar. Until then,
neither Delhi nor Washington is likely to succeed.
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The role of the U.S. military in the process, either
as part of the U.S.-Indian strategic partnership or as
part of U.S. overall efforts to cultivate such a partnership with Delhi, will be critical. Rightly so, because a
lot is at stake for the United States in this seemingly
remote backwater. As an area of growing external rivalries, the region of Central-South Asia is a source of
both traditional and nontraditional security threats to
U.S. national interests, be that in the political, military,
or even economic domain. From interstate conflicts to
transnational terrorism and from Russia’s attempts
to reestablish geopolitical control to China’s efforts
to achieve economic dominance, the region is a focal point of intersecting challenges and opportunities
that the U.S. military should be better positioned to
address and leverage in support of U.S. national interests. Pursuing those objectives as part of U.S. economic, political, and military efforts would help India
unlock its strategic potential and assist Washington in
unlocking that of its own.
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I: INDIA’S DELAYED ARRIVAL
AND ASPIRATIONS IN CENTRAL ASIA
India’s impressive economic growth over the last
2 1/2 decades has brought India’s role and interests
in the world and Central-South Asia to the forefront
of global politics and statecraft. Importantly, it has
put India into a comparative perspective with China,
another aspiring Asian great power poised to stiffen
competition for resources and influence among established and emerging powers alike. Both are resourcehungry and rapidly emerging powers seeking a new
place and role in the global economic and security orders. Both are also strategic rivals and consider their
immediate neighborhood of Central Asia of growing
strategic importance to their grand strategies. Just as
China has viewed its westward expansion into Central Asia imperative to acquire resources and project
power globally, so has India deemed its northward
push into the region essential to nurture and expand
its strategic potential as an aspiring global power.
For now, China has outperformed India in Central Asia on all counts, securing the region as a key
resource base and platform for power projection. In
2012, India launched the “Connect Central Asia” policy to shore up its regional presence, but the policy has
not secured for it a regional stake comparable to other
established or emerging great powers. Select elements
of India’s strategic culture and a number of geopolitical constraints explain the country’s lagging position
behind China and its constrained role in the world
and the Central-South Asian region.
Indian authorities have not fully discarded the
legacy of India’s nonalignment ideology and the role
of this ideology in the country’s foreign policy, which
has only recently started assuming a more assertive
5

posture that takes national interests, not ideology, as
its baseline. They are also coping with India’s lost orientation following the dissolution of the Soviet Union
and are still defining India’s global and regional visions and roles. Finally, they continue to be preoccupied with India’s domestic challenges impeding more
focused external policies and engagement. Together,
these factors make India’s external direction slow and
unclear, its policies less targeted and sustainable. Unless Indian elites address these issues, enhancing India’s global and regional position will prove a harder
enterprise for the country that sees itself as an aspiring
great power.
The same goes regarding India’s ability to address
a number of geopolitical constraints, which are products of geography, history, and India’s relations with
neighbors. The existence of a disconnected broader
region of Central-South Asia is chief among them. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, which set Central Asian countries free to pursue links with neighbors in South Asia, and the U.S. military presence in
Eurasia’s heartland for the first time in history, which
opened a connection between Central and South Asia,
both regions remain largely disconnected from within
and without. They are also the areas that are least integrated with the global economy and whose constituent units have tense relations, impeding trade and
economic development. India does not share a border
with Central Asia and has to rely on the relatively
isolated Iran, unstable Afghanistan, and airlifts from
Delhi and Dubai to trade with the region.
India further confronts what I call the “quicksands”
of Afghanistan and Pakistan—a status quo of now
chronic instability and security risks in the region that
sustain the disconnection between Central and South

6

Asia and limit significantly regional economic development and India’s strategic reach in and beyond both
regions. The instability in Afghanistan and Delhi’s
tensions with Islamabad prevent India from establishing a direct and expanded link with Central Asia.
Prospects of civil war, separatism, and disintegration
in Afghanistan and Pakistan present additional challenges for India’s efforts to connect with the region.
Delhi views its ascendance in Central and South Asia
as critical for its plans to become a great power. But it
cannot achieve this status without mitigating the challenges facing Afghanistan and Pakistan and addressing its tensions with Islamabad and Beijing, especially
as they concern the transit role of Kashmir.
Besides geopolitical constraints involving Pakistan,
China, and Afghanistan, India also faces a highly competitive role played by China, with which it fought a
war and still has unresolved border disputes. Delhi is
concerned about China’s emergence as a neighboring
great power and related impact on India’s global position in a potentially reformatted global economic and
security order. It is also especially wary about Beijing’s
perceived encirclement strategy to keep India tied to
South Asia and the growing role of Pakistan as Beijing’s platform to deny Delhi an active regional role.
The legacy of the 1962 border war and Sino-Indian
border disputes reinforce this perception, impeding
the development of transcontinental links via CentralSouth Asia (especially through Xingjian and Kashmir)
with the participation of India, China, and Pakistan.
Despite its growing capabilities, India is starting
its ascendance to the ranks of great powers from a
lower economic base and at a slower pace compared
to China and other Southeast Asian economies. It is
the last major Asian economy to join the Asian eco-
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nomic renaissance—a courtesy of its leadership during the Cold War that considered the success of others “as largely irrelevant to its [India’s] own future”
and favored the “continuation of existing policies” as
a sign of the country’s autonomous role in world affairs.1 Only in the 1990s did Indian authorities start
advancing economic reforms with a focus on privatization, a process that continues to this day and still
faces enormous challenges. Unlike other Asian economies, India embarked on reforms after the collapse of
the Soviet Union and amid expanding U.S.-led global
economic integration and the risk of “increasing marginalization” if India failed to reform. The urgency of
economic reforms was so grave that it prompted one
commentator to compare India’s shift of economic
gears with India’s second independence, only this
time “from a rapacious and domineering state.”2 As a
result, India is only now starting to enjoy the fruits of
its economic reforms.
Those factors help explain why India’s trade with
Central Asia was just $U.S.1.24 billion (B) in 201314 compared to China’s at U.S.$50B or why, despite
friendly relations, India’s model of development is
not appealing and the regional states do not view India as a major counterbalancing force in their external
strategies just yet. To beef up its foreign policy and
to change the status quo in the region, in 2012, India
launched the “Connect Central Asia” policy to link
South and Central Asia via energy, trade, and transit
corridors—a constrained connectivity initiative of an
aspiring great power (India) with an agenda similar
to the mission of the poorly executed New Silk Road
Strategy (NSRS) of a relatively declining power (the
United States). If successful, the policy would create
a sustainable economic corridor between Central and
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South Asia, helping India project its presence in both
regions and achieve a great power status sooner.
Be it as it may, India’s “connect” policy faces tough
competition, especially from the Russia-led Eurasian
Economic Union (EEU) and the China-led Silk-Road
Economic Belt (“belt”). This is despite India’s promising areas of engagement with Central Asian republics
in areas as diverse as energy resources exploitation,
nuclear energy cooperation, transit infrastructure
development, trade facilitation, military and defense
collaboration, development of space exploration related programs, and external strategic balancing. The
policy is also conceptually concentrated on and limited to reconstruction and integration of Afghanistan
with Central and South Asia, while lacking financial
and diplomatic resources for this task. It further ignores India’s strategic need—no less geopolitically
significant as the internal and external integration of
Afghanistan—to resolve tensions with Pakistan and
China and capitalize on their roles in reconnecting
the regions and unlocking India’s strategic potential. Therefore, despite its projected rise as a great
power in the long term, India’s south-north “push”
in the next decade will be weaker and less assertive
than China’s east-west “pull.” Bureaucratic politics at
home and instability in the immediate neighborhood
will keep India largely confined to South Asia and the
Indian Ocean.
The regional position of the United States, too,
faces major challenges. Washington and its allies are
in the process of withdrawing from Afghanistan—a
development that evokes concerns of unmanaged instability in the region and U.S. disregard of CentralSouth Asia at the time when new security challenges
and opportunities are emerging, which could either
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undermine or reinforce U.S. global standing and its
long-term capacity to remain a global power. What
is more, it is a U.S.-Indian strategic cooperation that
is increasingly in demand to ensure that both Washington and Delhi succeed in addressing these security threats, capitalizing on these opportunities, and
achieving their objectives in Central-South Asia and
the world at large.
Currently, the U.S. strategic presence in the region
and achievements as part of the NSRS leave much to
be desired. By 2016, the United States is likely to withdraw from Afghanistan on schedule, without major
political or military gains from the conflict that has
cost it and its partners a fortune in lives and money.
The future of its military infrastructure, including
bases, agreements, and relationships with countries
in Central-South Asia, is a big unknown, not only for
its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), but also partners in the region. The latter
equate the U.S. military pullout with its waning commitment to support the regional economic and security order, to which Washington contributed but which
it is now struggling to shape.
The fate of the U.S. NSRS is no longer as important as it was originally promoted to be, and not only
because of its own deficiencies in the form of limited
funding, lacking commitment, and inactive leadership. Other actors are increasingly implementing similar concepts in practice and with a lot of success, enabling them to advance their national interests while
advancing regional development. Beneficial as it is in
some ways for the region, the implementation of similar connectivity initiatives by other actors without an
effective and committed participation by the United
States in its own initiative, let alone other projects,
risks marginalizing the U.S. regional role of promot10

ing globalization and development as key pillars of its
national security strategy.
In the meantime, efforts of established powers to
maintain their positions in the face of growing presence of emerging powers complicate the already complex mosaic of relationships in the region, surrounded
as it is by four nuclear powers. Central and South Asia
are experiencing instability but are reconnecting after
decades of isolation. Iran is poised to become a key
regional economic integrator after decades of isolation imposed by the West. China and India are rising
as great powers and seeking to advance their interests with growing force. Russia seeks to reassert its
traditional geopolitical role in the post-Soviet space.
In short, parts of Eurasia are seeing a reconfiguration
of their geopolitical maps—the processes the U.S.
military should be ready to shape to advance U.S.
national interests in the rapidly changing strategic
environment.
Indeed, the continent is undergoing rapid power
shifts brought about by the rise of new powers and
assertiveness of established ones, while confronting
threats from nonstate actors like the Islamic State (IS)
seeking to advance their agenda at all cost. But while
the United States is present militarily in Central-South
Asia, it is barely present economically and plans to
disengage militarily at exactly the time when its overall presence is of growing importance to its ability to
pursue new military missions in Eurasia and remain a
relevant global player. India’s situation is similar, but
only to an extent: it, too, is hardly present in Central
Asia, but has a strong desire to set a deeper footprint
as a way to achieve a status of great power. What they
have in common is their lack of strategic presence in
the region yet combined potential to be significant
actors in Central-South Asia.
11

To help unlock their strategic potentials globally
and regionally, Washington and India should partner
in Central Asia. Doing this is not going to be easy.
Both states share political impediments, institutional
mistrust, and a number of grievances. India views it
increasingly important to carve out for itself an independent role reflecting its ascendance and confirming
its status as a rising power and has traditionally positioned itself as an autonomous actor unwilling to be
a “pawn” of other powers. Washington, in turn, may
not want to commit to a strategic partnership that does
not reflect a bigger voice and role by the United States,
among other reasons. Yet, both recognize the growing
importance of aligning their views and joining forces
in tackling emerging challenges and opportunities. India’s go-it-alone approach has earned it little by way of
global or regional presence, while the U.S. do-it-alone
approach has undermined its influence worldwide. In
the meantime, the rise of China is yet to erect barriers
to Delhi’s emergence as a great power and Washington’s ability to retain its status as the strongest actor.
Latest developments in the U.S.-Indian relations
indicate that both actors are strengthening their strategic cooperation without compromising each other’s
vital interests. In 2015, Delhi and Washington concluded another nuclear energy cooperation deal, opening
the door for Delhi to import U.S. technologies critical
for India’s status as an ascending technological power
in sectors other than information technology (IT). This
they did despite India not being a member of the NonProliferation Treaty (NPT). The agreement comes a decade after the parties concluded the first nuclear deal,
seen as a “paradigm shift” in India’s geopolitical code,
with Delhi feeling increasingly comfortable partnering
with the United States to counter China’s advances in

12

areas viewed as lying within India’s periphery.3 Both
are pursuing similar connectivity strategies toward
Central-South Asia. And both are increasing bilateral
cooperation—in large part to even the scales of global
power flows—as they confront a rising China in the
Pacific and Indian oceans and now across Eurasia.
The United States would benefit from a much
stronger strategic presence by India in the heart of
Eurasia. The former is a relatively declining power
and a democracy that can facilitate India’s ascendance
to a great power status quicker and with less obstacles.
The latter is a rapidly emerging power and a democracy with an increasingly entrepreneurial and growing middle class, which can assist the United States
in ensuring a peaceful global power transition from
“the West to the rest.” Both should also be less concerned about competing with each other for strategic
influence in Central Asia. The United States is far from
the continent, does not wield influence in the region
comparable to Russia or China, and would welcome
India’s stronger presence to ensure that neither Beijing nor Moscow dominates the region. India, in turn,
is closer to Central Asia but is a democracy, lacks any
imperial legacy of expansion into Central Asia and,
importantly, does not enjoy a strategic presence and
perceived intent to dominate the broader region—all
while facing Russia’s and China’s opposition to its
regional advances.
A strategic partnership with a focus on Central
Asia between the United States and India should be
premised on joint and unilateral actions aimed at mitigating Af-Pak security challenges to facilitate India’s
linkages with Central Asia; shaping the geopolitical
role of Iran to advance U.S. and Indian interests in
the broader region; fostering Sino-Indian cooperation
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to enable India’s linkages with China, Pakistan, and
Central Asia via Kashmir and Xingjian; and exploiting grand strategies and connectivity initiatives of
other actors in Central-South Asia, such as Russia and
China, to advance their own policies. Importantly, the
U.S.-Indian partnership should not constrain Sino-Indian cooperation where it advances India’s position in
Central-South Asia. Beijing plays a growing role in the
evolution and stability of Afghanistan and Pakistan,
and its interest in developing links between the Middle East and Central-South Asia could significantly
facilitate U.S. and Indian regional policy if Delhi and
Washington play their regional cards right.
The United States will not be able to achieve the
previous objectives without relying on its military.
From mitigating security challenges in the Af-Pak
region, given the planned military withdrawal from
Afghanistan and reformatting its missions in light of
potential U.S.-Iranian détente, to promoting confidence building and shared security and crises management approaches with China and India and protection of vast and expanding economic infrastructure
throughout Eurasia, the support of the U.S. military
to the overall U.S. strategy in the region is going to be
critical for U.S. general efforts to unlock India’s strategic potential across all four objectives. The earlier
Washington engages Delhi in the region, the easier
it will be for Washington to shape India’s emergence
as a great power to support U.S. regional and global
security agenda.
India’s rise is undeniable and set to expand its
global reach and Central Asia’s connectivity with
South Asia. With time, Central Asian states may find
it imperative to deflect the growing pressure from the
east (China) and north (Russia) by cultivating closer
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ties with the south (India), as they look for a secure
way of connecting with the world as independent
units. India’s potentially transformational regional
engagement is there to help. But Delhi is currently a
latecomer to the region’s 21st century “Great Game”
and faces tough competition from Russia and China,
making it critical for Delhi to partner with Washington to bolster its strategic presence in the region.
Until then, India’s arrival in Central Asia will remain
delayed for the foreseeable future, making it harder
for Delhi to turn its regional aspirations into sustainable long-term gains. Regardless of whether Delhi
and Washington enter a strategic partnership in the
region, the United States should better understand
and help India address select elements of its strategic
culture and geopolitical constraints that are impeding
its efforts to connect with the region.
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II: INDIA’S STRATEGIC CULTURE AND
GEOPOLITICAL CONSTRAINTS
Undefined Role, Unclear Direction.
A number of elements of India’s strategic culture
explain Delhi’s limited engagement with Central Asia.
India’s legacy of nonalignment, lost orientation, and
focus on internal agenda following the collapse of the
Soviet Union, and relatively passive foreign policy
have rendered its global role poorly defined and executed and, ultimately, unfulfilled. As a result, India
has not pursued a clear direction, projected an appealing normative model of development, or exclusively
relied on its national interests as the guiding principle
of its foreign policy. But India recognizes these issues
and, given its projected emergence as an influential
global player, has sought to adjust its foreign policy
in light of unfolding global dynamics and its national
interests.
While India officially discarded the ideological
underpinnings of its nonalignment after the end of
the Cold War, its foreign policy continues to reflect
and project related principles. India refuses to participate in power-balancing schemes or serve perceived
agendas of other power(s). This makes it difficult for
Delhi to utilize the leverage of its potential allies and
partners in areas of the world where its role is limited
compared to its strategic needs. In Central Asia, where
its geopolitical presence is insignificant but its needs
and future role are potentially enormous, aligning
with other actors would benefit Delhi. However, India tries to avoid becoming a “pawn” in the perceived
U.S. chess game of containing China and Russia in the
heart of Eurasia.

17

In a way, Delhi finds it difficult to part with the
legacy of its nonalignment model because it has simply not yet developed a new one. Pursuing a foreign
policy reflecting elements of nonalignment allows it
to preserve some sense of direction in the otherwise
less controlled geopolitical environment. Ironically,
the end of India’s nonalignment de facto came not with
the end of the Cold War, but with it. After Indian and
Chinese troops clashed along the border in 1962 and
after Washington and Beijing reached détente in 1972,
India was compelled—despite its promoted status of
nonalignment—to align itself with the Soviet Union
to balance the Sino-Pakistani-U.S. axis,4 while leaving
room for a strategic autonomy vis-à-vis Moscow and
retaining popularity in the third world. The demise
of the Soviet Union shattered Delhi’s perception of its
strategic environment and its role as the leader of the
nonalignment movement.
India’s foreign policy was disoriented, while its
domestic policy was preoccupied with development
challenges caused by the rupture of economic links
with the Soviet Union. Former Indian Ambassador
to the United States Abid Husain, an economist, described India as a tiger in a cage, a potentially powerful yet hesitant actor: “When the cage is open, the tiger
would show its real strength. The cage is now open
but the tiger refuses to come out of the cage.”5 Focusing on domestic challenges after the collapse of the
Soviet Union distracted India from pursuing an active
foreign policy, which has lacked assertiveness and
only recently started operating in geopolitical codes
rather than ideological frames of nonalignment. Its
foreign policy also focused on the immediate region of
South Asia, while treating Central Asia as Moscow’s
periphery and neglecting China’s growing influence
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in the region. This explains India’s “gap between ambitions and capabilities” in the region that persists to
this day.6
India’s inward-looking focus and preoccupation
with domestic agenda have further prevented it from
the creation of a normative and appealing development model and pursuit of a larger objective beyond
its borders, even as the country has been gaining economic strength. Leading Indian intellectuals at the
1919 Paris Peace Conference reportedly envisioned
an independent India that would not project power
outward or seek to dominate other states. This left
little room for “a global objective in Indian strategic
culture,” contributing to the emergence of a nonalignment tradition that bore the hallmarks of “sovereignty
and autarky” viewed as “independence from the rest
of the world, rather than as a particular way of engaging others.”7 As an expert on India’s security policy,
Achin Vanaik observes that India’s foreign policy
has not had a “real strategic vision or well-developed
strategic sense, being too prone to a moralistic form
of posturing as a substitute for pursuing hard-headed
and self-serving foreign policy perspective.” The lack
of recognition of the importance of power accumulation and power politicking, Vanaik argues, allowed
external forces to “repeatedly invade and defeat India
over the centuries.”8
India’s proclivity to wait rather than act is another
aspect attributed to its strategy, culture, and foreign
policy. Rodney W. Jones, an expert on South Asia,
for instance, argues that India is determined “to wait
the opponent out” rather than engage it in an effort
to produce “a pragmatic compromise”—a position
reflecting India’s “profound sense of entitlement, superiority, and presumed deeper knowledge about the
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correlation of forces that distinguish India’s strategic
culture.”9 The result is a rising India that remains a
spectator with a “wait-and-watch-and-hope-for-thebest” approach10 rather than an active actor using every opportunity to enhance its presence in the region
of growing importance for its ascendance as a great
power. Unlike China and the EEU, whose “normative power” is based on the power of active example,
India’s is based on the power of “passive example.”
Delhi has an expectation that other actors will follow
India without it having to provide any inducements.11
But it has not yet succeeded in leveraging effectively its rich popular identity, maturing politics, and
economic progress.12
India’s anti-colonial struggle, nonalignment tradition, and unfulfilled economic potential have discouraged Delhi from actively promoting itself as a model,
let alone imposing its vision of development on other
countries. In Central Asia, it seeks to lead the way for
regional republics—without a model—in areas such
as democratic and secular development, building of
multi-ethnic societies, and economic modernization.
But even such an unimposing approach comes with
a price. India’s political influence in the region is very
weak. Delhi does not support regional opposition
groups, considers the evolution of the regional states
and societies through the lens of Islamic currents, supports a multi-ethnic federal system rather than unitary
nation-state building premised on a dominant ethnic
group, and has failed to demonstrate convincingly the
fruits of its economic modernization given its widespread poverty and legacy of its cast system.13
India’s economic growth in high digits over the
years (7.5 percent this year) and tensions with China
and Pakistan nevertheless have prompted Delhi to
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pursue a more assertive foreign policy. India’s nuclear
test in 1998 demonstrated Delhi’s more assertive foreign policy posture not just vis-à-vis nuclear-armed
Pakistan and China, with which it has fought several
wars (1948-49, 1965, 1971 with Pakistan, and 1962 with
China), but also in relation to the United States and
others with which it seeks equal great power relations.
The test revealed Delhi’s technological prowess and,
importantly, its intent to show off its capabilities as a
rising actor ready to assume a geopolitical role no longer constrained by the Cold War.14 As former Indian
Foreign Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee explained,
India’s intensified engagement with South Asia and
increasingly other areas of the world is “the beginning
of the reassertion of India’s historically benign and
stabilizing role in these regions, premised on the commerce of ideas and goods.”15
According to Indian strategist C. Raja Mohan, India’s grand strategy is preoccupied with three concentric geographic circles: an immediate neighborhood
where India seeks primacy; an “extended neighborhood” covering the rest of Asia and Indian Ocean littoral where it seeks to counterbalance other powers
and prevent them from undercutting its interests; and
the rest of the world where India sees itself as a great
power capable of playing a key global role.16 On a regional level, and specific to Central Asia, India gradually has transitioned to a more active formulation of
its policy toward the region, as well. It started with
its “Look North” and “Look West” policies toward
Central-West Asia, initiating its “Connect Central
Asia” policy in 2012. The “connect” policy seeks not
to “look” north but to “connect” the north, reflecting
an emphasis on action rather than observation. India
intends to pursue a more direct and impactful engage-
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ment with Central Asia by making Afghanistan the
hub of interregional reconnection.
But intent is not a capability, and India is yet to
overcome a number of deficiencies related to its strategic culture and foreign policy, as well as major connectivity and geopolitical constraints, before it can
enjoy strategic presence in Central Asia even remotely
comparable to great powers.
Constrained Interregional Connectivity.
India faces a number of connectivity constraints
limiting its presence in Central Asia: the fact of a disconnected Central and South Asia as a broader region;
India’s lack of a contiguous border with Central Asia;
significant geographical barriers; India’s unresolved
political tensions with Pakistan and China; and interstate rivalries within Central and South Asia. The instability of Afghanistan and Pakistan is another major
factor, which is addressed in a separate section.
India and the rest of South Asia had interacted
with Central Asia for centuries. But the division of
spheres of influence between the tsarist Russia and
Great Britain in the 19th century, the creation of the
Soviet Union in the early-20th century, and the partition of India in 1947 sealed the borders between the
two regions, leaving them largely disconnected—a
status quo that in a significant way persists to this
day.17 India found itself largely cut off from Central
Asia during the Cold War, despite maintaining deeper ties with Central Asian republics compared to other
powers due to its friendly relations with the Soviet
Union until the latter’s collapse in 1991. The demise
of the Soviet Union allowed Central Asian states to
pursue links with South Asian neighbors as indepen-
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dent units, but the constituent states of both regions
failed to develop strong relations with each other or
neighbors. The regional republics were preoccupied
with day-to-day survival and consolidation as nationstates, guarding their newly found independence and
perceiving countries in South Asia as less stable, less
developed, and more risky partners, instead seeking
ties with Russia, Turkey, European partners, and the
United States, among other actors.
Civil war in Tajikistan in the 1900s and instability
in Afghanistan from the 1900s onwards further impeded the development of any linkages between Central and South Asian countries. Both Tajikistan and
Afghanistan represented and still represent connection points between Central and South Asia, making
it crucial for their elites and counterparts in neighboring states to address any ongoing security concerns
centered on separatism, cross-border militancy, and
Islamist agenda. The instability in Tajikistan and Afghanistan facilitated cooperation between India and
Central Asian states aimed at stabilizing the security
situations in both countries. Today, this cooperation
is in the works, given India’s concerns about the regional instability impacting its projected rise. But the
planned exit of coalition forces from Afghanistan and
the potential departure of Washington may delay and
constrain India’s efforts to reconnect with the region,
even if it would stimulate a need for Delhi’s deeper
engagement with Central Asia.
The U.S. military invasion of Afghanistan after
September 11, 2001 (9/11) has been a transformational
development for the broader region. But the reconnection process it set in motion may stall, if not reverse,
when Washington and its coalition allies pull out of
Afghanistan. The presence of U.S. forces in the heart
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of Eurasia for the first time in history led to the creation of the Northern Distribution Network as a corridor running supplies across Central Asia to coalition
forces in Afghanistan. It has also encouraged intraregional and interregional collaboration on economic,
political, and security matters, as concerned parties
have searched for a solution to the conflict in Afghanistan and better prospects for their development. But
the longevity and aftermath of this reconnection process as driven by the military presence of coalition
forces is a big question mark after 2016. The end of this
process and India’s do-it-alone approach in the region
portend complications for Delhi’s efforts to reconnect
Central and South Asia via a more stable, developed,
and integrated Afghanistan.
Unlike China, Russia, or Iran, India also lacks a
contiguous border with Central Asia, which makes
the pursuit of trade and transit links with the region a
much harder enterprise. India has to rely on the relatively isolated Iran, unstable Afghanistan, and airlifts
from Delhi and Dubai to trade with the region. Geographic barriers presented by the Himalayan mountain range complicate its reach north as well, making
the development and advancement of India’s links
with China’s Xingjian and Tibet a challenging, though
not impossible, task on technical grounds. (Interestingly, China has boosted its connectivity infrastructure within Tibet and Xingjian provinces for economic
and military purposes. But India has lagged behind
in similar efforts in its northern areas,18 including in
Aksai Chin—a region adjacent to Jammu and Kashmir that China administers but India disputes. Beijing
uses Aksai Chin to connect Xingjian and Tibet via its
national highway.) Moreover, the Indian subcontinent
is rather “self-contained,” with a harsh terrain and an
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ocean isolating it on all sides and making it more of
an island than a territory integrated with Eurasia.19
Robert Kaplan correctly points out the limiting factor
of geography on India’s global and regional ambitions: “India is a regional power to the degree that it
is entrapped by this geography; it is a potential great
power to the degree that it can move beyond it.”20
India’s rivalries and tensions with Pakistan and
China, along with perceived security threats from
Bangladesh and Nepal, present a major obstacle for
India to connect with Central Asia, while “robbing India of vital political energy” to project power across
Eurasia.21 Pakistan, India’s rival in South Asia ever
since India’s partition in 1947, denies India overland
access to Central Asia, forcing it to rely on airlifts, sealanes, and overland links via Iran and then Afghanistan to trade with the region.22 Meanwhile, Sino-Indian disputes, including over Aksai Chin and parts of
Arunachal and Himachal Pradesh, continue to strain
the relationship between the two powers that once
fought a war over contended borders. India’s borders
with Pakistan and China are currently either sealed or
partially open at few crossings, impeding transcontinental trade and transit.
Rivalries and tensions within Central and South
Asia among constituent states further impair interregional connectivity by hampering linkages within and
between respective regions. In Central Asia, stricken
by border, water, and ethnic disputes (especially in
the Fergana Valley shared by Tajikistan, Uzbekistan,
and Kyrgyzstan), a relatively isolated Uzbekistan and
relatively open Kazakhstan struggle for regional primacy. In South Asia, riddled by insurgencies and militancy, the nuclear-armed Pakistan and India jockey
for regional influence, as well.
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India has a lot to accomplish in Central-South Asia,
as both regions remain largely disconnected from
within and without and represent the areas that are
least integrated with the global economy. This makes
the involvement of great and emerging powers in
the regions a source of opportunities and challenges,
advancing the regions’ external integration but with
a potential cost to the sovereignty and independence
of the constituent countries. India is one such power
that is projected to be an economic engine driving the
reconnection of the regions, provided it properly addresses the connectivity constraints and Af-Pak challenges limiting its regional engagement.
Quicksands of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
To a significant degree, India’s limited presence in
Central Asia is a factor of the war-torn Afghanistan
and volatile security situation in Pakistan. The unfinished war in Afghanistan and the planned withdrawal
of coalition forces from the country by 2016 threatens
further instability in Central-South Asia and reversal
of any modest connectivity gains that India and the
regions have attained at a big cost. Meanwhile, economic and security challenges in Pakistan may swell
considerably, threatening the country’s disintegration
and, along with Afghanistan, inviting the involvement of state and nonstate actors and exacerbating the
already fragile political and security fabric of CentralSouth Asia. India is yet to realize that its success in
Afghanistan and Central Asia are hardly possible
without its significantly improved ties with Pakistan
and China—the countries playing a major geopolitical and geo-economic role in Afghanistan and broader
Central-South Asia. Absent that, India will remain
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trapped in the quicksands of the Af-Pak region, unable to project a meaningful geopolitical role in either
Central-South Asia or beyond.
After the withdrawal of coalition forces, Afghanistan may experience disintegration due to a potential
flare-up of civil war or major sectarian conflict that
could engulf neighboring Iran, Pakistan, and Central
Asian states. Expansion of the conflict beyond the borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan could bring about
systemic perturbations, if not for the global security
system then certainly for the Eurasian continent or its
geopolitical subsystems. This, in part, explains Delhi’s
focus on reconstruction of Afghanistan and reconnection of Central and South Asia via Afghanistan as
the interregional node of trade, energy, and transit
connecting the two regions. This thinking in India’s
foreign policy is significant. It goes beyond Delhi’s
traditional and still strong obsession with Pakistan to
encompass its responsible reconstruction role and a
forward-looking policy vis-à-vis Central Asia despite,
indeed because of, the war in Afghanistan.
India is concerned about Islamabad’s and Beijing’s
efforts to draw Kabul into their fold, especially after
coalition troops leave Afghanistan. A Taliban-ruled
Afghanistan once provided Islamabad with a platform for its strategic depth strategy that fed India’s
sense of insecurity.23 China’s growing presence in Afghanistan may yet deal a blow to India’s plans seeking
to establish its own strategic foothold in the country.
India’s rivalry with Pakistan and China over Kabul is
important to India for securing Afghanistan as the interregional link advancing Delhi’s agenda. But in the
current shape, this process binds India to a two-front
struggle with neighbors, sapping its resources and accentuating heavily the competitive rather than collab-
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orative dynamics in its relationships with Islamabad
and Beijing. Delhi should reformulate its engagement
in Afghanistan and Central Asia by pursuing a cooperative accommodation with Pakistan and China
focused more on collaboration than competition or
disengagement. Achieving either outcome would
be impossible without China and Pakistan changing
their postures vis-à-vis India, as well. Currently, such
will is weak in all three capitals—a dangerous status
quo, considering Pakistan’s growing strategic role for
China in promoting transcontinental development
via Central and South Asia without the participation
of India.
A more positive cooperation involving China,
Pakistan, and India would be hard to achieve without addressing the dispute over Kashmir and the latter’s role as a trilateral and transcontinental connector. The division of Greater Kashmir into Jammu and
Kashmir and Azad Jammu Kashmir, administered by
India and Pakistan respectively, and the establishment of a Line of Actual Control in 1949 over which
China, India, and Pakistan fought several wars in the
1960s, 1970s, and 1900s undermined any prospects of
expanded transcontinental links.24 The status quo in
Kashmir constrains Indo-Pakistan and Sino-Indian
ties; prevents expanded transit and trade between
Central, South, and East Asia; and could threaten an
open interstate conflict. The three countries view their
control over parts of Greater Kashmir as a source of
military advantage in a possible escalation of conflict,
reinforcing a perceived need to control the evolution
of the region in ways that hamper rather than facilitate
trade via this territory. Instead, they could cultivate
regional stability by fostering the independence of a
unified Kashmir. Since this position seems untenable
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at this time, the parties should pursue other possible
arrangements.
Besides tensions with Pakistan and China, as well
as instability in Afghanistan, India also has to grapple
with potentially game-changing regional ramifications of a volatile Pakistan. The issue of Pakistan’s
territorial integrity has haunted its elites since the
country’s creation in 1947, when it was carved out
of India and saw a part of its territory now known as
Bangladesh secede in 1971 in a bloody war. Nearly 4
decades since, Islamabad has struggled to ensure domestic security amid militant attacks, some of which
bear the hallmarks of separatism. Pakistani authorities fight Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and Pakistani Taliban in
Baluchistan, federally administered tribal areas, and
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, besides struggling to maintain
their hold on Kashmir. The funding of militant groups
against Soviet forces and India has ricocheted against
Pakistan. In 2014 alone, militant and terrorist attacks
against the state and minorities left approximately
5,500 people dead, including civilians, security forces,
and insurgents/terrorists.25 The chronic instability
could threaten popular unrest or disintegration of the
nuclear-armed state, producing consequences with
which India would not be able to cope alone and that
would exacerbate the instability in Afghanistan and
further complicate India’s efforts to reconnect with
Central Asia.
The less opportunities Pakistan has for economic
development, the higher the risks of its disintegration
and negative ramifications for neighbors in the region,
especially India. Delhi should pursue a policy aimed at
not only reconstruction and reconnection of Afghanistan but also incorporation of Pakistan in the regional
economic system, with and without urgently needed
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political arrangements necessary to decrease its tensions with Islamabad. Ensuring a responsible and
constructive role by Pakistan in domestic and regional
security should inform India’s political, economic,
and security dialogue and engagement with China as
Pakistan’s main partner. India’s success as an aspiring great power requires a projection of power and a
search for resources to buttress such power in order to
address geopolitical dilemmas centered on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and China. India’s search for genuine
cooperation with Pakistan and China would accelerate the stabilization, reconstruction, and integration of
Afghanistan into Eurasia’s fabric of commerce, while
unleashing India’s strategic potential. Until then,
the quicksands of the Af-Pak region will continue
constraining Delhi’s global and regional reach.
China’s Head Start and Encirclement of India.
As if facing volatile Afghanistan and Pakistan were
not enough, Delhi also has to contend with ambitions
of China—the only other Asian power challenging India’s long-term rise and search for resources, routes,
markets, and bases in Central Asia. China had an earlier start in the race, initiating economic reforms in the
1978-80s and unleashing a wave of economic development unprecedented in history. It has also pursued
more skillfully its perceived strategy of encirclement
of India, while Delhi has lagged behind with its own
policies countering China and unleashing its own potential, including in Central Asia. China’s more successful use of partnerships as part of a more homogenous and centralized foreign policy and sharing of
a borderline with Central Asia has ensured China a
more expansive influence in the region.
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China’s advantages over India notwithstanding,
India has a number of attributes potentially making
it the largest economy and a major strategic partner
for Central Asia in the long term: India’s democratic
system, relatively young and increasingly mobile
population, entrepreneurial spirit of its growing
middle class, and the wide use of English language,
among others.
China undertook economic reforms about a decade earlier than India. As an early starter, it achieved
the status of the largest economy in 2014. With an
economy worth $U.S.17.6 trillion (T) compared to the
U.S. economy worth U.S.$17.4T (based on purchasing power parity), China enjoys the largest economic
presence in Central Asia. India, on the other hand,
began “waking up” only in the early-1990s after the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold
War forced it to reconsider its domestic and foreign
policy in light of the transformed external environment. India then embarked on privatization of its
economy (which continues to this day) and pursuit
of a foreign policy increasingly guided by national interests rather than an ideology of nonalignment that
drew on perceived impractical ideals. Still, India continues to lag behind China in economic development,
especially in infrastructure investment, manufacturing, and education. Similar to China, it struggles with
pervasive corruption, challenges of privatization, as
well as sectarianism and separatism in a number of
states. Its democracy in the short term is no match for
China’s authoritarian system that “can make things
happen” on command. In India, locals say “development takes place in spite of, rarely because of, government.”26 While India’s society has remained traditionally strong, its state has remained relatively weak.27
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But unlike China and Russia, and similar to democracies like the United States, India’s government
is unable to direct businesses to serve its geopolitical objectives in a given region with precision and
foresight widely attributed to Beijing and Moscow.
India does not have effective multilateral economic
platforms in Central Asia, its businesses do not get
considerable support of the government,28 and it does
not make businesses a major part of its grand strategy.
The companies led or controlled by China and Russia,
on the other hand, have been relatively successful in
acquiring assets and shoring up the countries’ influence in Central Asia and elsewhere. India’s increased
economic and political presence in the region is thus a
factor of more expanded collaboration between the Indian business community and the government.29 In the
short term, India’s approach of building its economy
from the bottom up is a disadvantage to its economic
position vis-à-vis China, which pursues a top-down
development approach.30
Beijing has also outsmarted India in geopolitics,
leveraging alliances and partnerships as part of its
relatively coherent and centralized foreign policy. In
the race for resources and power, China views India
as a rival and is seen as encircling China along its
flanks and tying it down to the confines of South Asia.
To that purpose, China has allegedly used its growing economic and security partnerships with Nepal,
Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar to India’s northeast; Sri-Lanka, Thailand, and Malaysia to India’s
southeast; Pakistan and Afghanistan to India’s northwest; and Central Asian states to India’s northwest.31
India’s border war with China in 1962 and political
tensions with Beijing have only underscored India’s
perception about Beijing’s perceived attempts to out-
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flank it.32 China’s alleged suggestion to the U.S. Pacific
Fleet in 2009 to recognize the Indian Ocean as part of
a Chinese sphere of influence have further reinforced
India’s perception of Beijing’s disregard of Delhi’s
ambitions and security interests.33
While China has relied significantly on Pakistan to
outdo India in South Asia, it feels no need to rely on
any other actor(s) to do so in adjoining Central Asia.
Beijing already enjoys a relative edge in terms of economic presence and influence, relegating India to the
status of a constrained, middle-ranked power that
does not even boast a rapidly growing settlement in
and emigration of its nationals to Central Asia. Nevertheless, China had to partner with Russia on global
and regional issues to advance its position in Central
Asia. Beijing and Moscow are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) opposing the U.S.
perceived unilateralism in world affairs. By recognizing Russia’s predominant security role in Central Asia
and proposing a free trade zone between the Moscowled Eurasian Union and the Beijing-led “belt,” China
seeks an enhanced position in the Central Asian
region without unnerving Moscow (just yet).
Despite this “marriage of convenience,” Beijing’s
ambitions threaten Russia’s long-term interests in
Central Asia. This creates an opening for Delhi and
Washington to exploit Moscow’s concerns in order to
promote their influence in Central Asia, including by
seeking an SCO membership for India. India’s membership in the SCO would enhance India’s ties with
regional states and enable Delhi to shape its competitive relationship with China on more collaborative
terms.34 India applied for membership in 2014 but
continues to confront resistance. Moscow supports
India’s membership to dilute China’s presence in the
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region, but China objects to it for fear of losing a share
of its growing influence in Central Asia. The SCO’s
rules and consensus among members that candidates
must be signatories to the NPT and not have conflicts
with members is another obstacle.35 Besides meeting
these conditions, established or presumed, Indian
elites would have to address their concerns about policy constraints, a loss of strategic autonomy, and association with authoritarian regimes that could come
with India’s membership in the organization.36
Besides seeking the SCO membership and partnering with other powers to counter China’s perceived
encirclement strategy, India has also been making its
own advances in countries lying on China’s periphery. In Southeast Asia, it has acquired assets in the
economies of Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan,
Thailand, and Vietnam. In Central Asia, it has cooperated with the regional states and Afghanistan against
the Taliban in the 1990s and after 9/11, imported arms
from Uzbekistan, sought rights to the use of the Ayni
airbase in Tajikistan, assisted with training of the Kazakh Caspian fleet, opened a mountain biomedical
research center, and participated in counterterrorism
exercises with Kyrgyz special forces in Kyrgyzstan.37
To counter China’s military encirclement, India is
modernizing its own military capabilities, enhancing
its power projection capacity, building logistics and
transit infrastructure in the north, and conducting military exercises with its distant and nearby partners.38
It has also sought the creation of a shared region-wide
energy market in Central-South Asia, in part by pursuing the Central Asia-South Asia 1000 (CASA-1000)
project and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) initiative to bring electricity and gas from
Central to South Asia. After it lost to China the Petro
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Kazakhstan deal in 2005, India further proposed a Pan
Asian grid backed by a U.S.$22.4B commitment, but
the idea went off the radar after a reshuffle in its Petroleum Ministry.39
Despite their tense and competitive relations, India
and China have been improving their ties over the last
3 decades, with an increase in bilateral trade being a
vivid demonstration of this development that may yet
translate into more friendly ties. The complementarity
of their economies—India is a leader in services production, while China is a leader in manufacturing—
adds another positive spin on the bilateral relationship that is already enjoying a bilateral trade turnover
of U.S.$71B (though India’s trade deficit with China of
U.S.$47B is a thorn). Chinese Premier Wen Jibao, for
instance, remarked that India and China had conflicts
only briefly in the 2,000-year history of exchanges, and
the bilateral ties have been 99.9 percent friendly.40 As
Kaplan explains, “India’s rivalry with China is not
like the one with Pakistan at all: it is more abstract,
less emotional, and (far more significantly) less volatile. And it is a rivalry with no real history behind it.”41
Furthermore, as former chief of the Indian navy Arun
Prakash argues:
Both China and India have certain common threads
running through their history, and this helps rationalize their contemporary behaviour as nation-states.
Both are ancient civilizational entities with a very
strong religious-cum-cultural underpinning which
explains the enduring nature of their mores and traditions. About 500 years ago, these two nations were so
prosperous that, between between them, they contributed over 50 per cent of the world’s GDP. Both have
experienced invasions; for most part from Central
Asia, but from the fifteenth century onwards, increas-
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ingly across their shores. While the overland invaders, whether they prevailed or were defeated, became
assimilated into the two resilient cultures, it was the
Western interlopers, coming by sea, who inflicted
subjugation and humiliation on both nations. This has
created a deep national urge never to allow a re-run of
history, and to regain past glory as early as possible.42

To be sure, both China and India face seemingly
intractable border disputes in Jammu and Kashmir,
Himachal Pradesh, and Arunachal Pradesh. At least
323 border incursions were reported in 2011 along the
Sino-Indian border, highlighting the extent of the dispute over the borderline and the risk of interstate collision. As of 2012, China maintained 400,000 troops in
Chengdu and Lanzhou, while India deployed 235,000
troops along its borders with Tibet.43 China, in addition to Pakistan and other nations in South Asia, have
been “sustaining several insurgent groups” in India.44
Meanwhile, India is refining its “two-front war” doctrine vis-à-vis China and Pakistan, while still perceiving China as a threat. Despite subsequently improved
rhetoric, India had viewed Beijing as its number one
threat right before the country’s 1998 nuclear test,
which it justified in part by pointing to the perceived
threat posed by China. As India’s Prime Minister Atal
Bihari Vajpayee explained in a letter to U.S. President
Bill Clinton: 45
I have been deeply concerned at the deteriorating security environment, especially the nuclear environment,
faced by India for some years past. We have an overt
nuclear weapons state on our borders, a state which
committed armed aggression against India in 1962. Although our relations with that country have improved
in the last decade or so, an atmosphere of distrust persists mainly due to the unresolved border problem. To
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add to the distrust, that country has materially helped
another neighbor of ours to become a covert nuclear
weapons state. At the hands of this bitter neighbor we
have suffered three aggressions in the last 50 years.
And for the last ten years we have been the victim of
unremitting terrorism and militancy sponsored by it
in several parts of our country, especially Punjab and
Jammu & Kashmir.46

But both increasingly realize the importance of a
positive dynamic in their relationship as two rising
powers and are working to resolve their disputes.
They mitigated tensions over Sikhim, opened up the
Nathula Pass across the Tibet-Uttar Pradesh for trade,
and may yet facilitate India’s links with Central Asia
via Aksai Chin and Xingjian.47 They also agreed to expand trade by opening up the Lipu-Lekh Pass linking India, China, and Nepal. Hu Shih, China’s former
ambassador to the United States, commented on prospects of cooperation this way: “India conquered and
dominated China culturally for 20 centuries [through
Buddhism] without ever having to send a single
soldier across her border.” Will it do so again, but
economically?48
Moreover, one could interpret the perceived strategies of encirclement by China and counterstrategy
by India as run-of-the-course expansions of economic and military power and influence of both rapidly
growing Asian nations, which are hungry for resources, energy, and opportunities and are coincidentally
seeking to secure them by extending respective influence in the same regions. This interpretation, however, has to withstand the test of time, geography, and
projected geopolitical dynamics currently positioning
the two powers as rivals and forcing India to rethink
its grand strategy of pursuing a strictly autonomous
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role in world affairs. As an authoritarian, relatively
homogenous, and economically wealthier state, China
has pursued a more effective, national interest-based
foreign policy that engages elements of power balancing and partnerships with allies and promotes China’s
model of development worldwide, including in Central Asia. China and India also view resource-rich
Central Asia as a platform of competition more than
cooperation between the two giants. Beijing seeks to
deny India a leverage over resource deliveries bound
for China from and via the Middle East and Central
Asia-South-Asia,49 even if India’s participation in China’s transcontinental projects could open new doors
for Beijing.
If they are not to leave India behind, Indian elites
need to think in geopolitical and strategic codes more
expansive than India’s immediate environs, projecting the country’s future against global dynamics in
light of India’s potential status of a global power in the
long term. They should also ponder India’s contribution to the world and its appeal as a developing and,
later, a developed nation. At this time, China’s model
of development—no matter how appealing, poorlydesigned, or promoted—is one asset India does not
yet possess, not in Central or South Asia. This helps
explain India’s relatively limited presence in both regions and its recent push at projecting its influence
in the greater region as part of its “Connect Central
Asia” policy.
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III: INDIA’S SEARCH FOR A WAY OUT:
PROSPECTS AND LIMITATIONS
Delhi’s “Connect Central Asia” Policy.
To mitigate challenges impeding its reconnection
with Central Asia and to expand its regional presence,
India launched the “Connect Central Asia” policy in
2012. The policy has enabled it to advance links with
Central Asia via Afghanistan but is yet to secure a regional strategic presence comparable to other powers.
Addressing deficiencies of the policy and ensuring the
implementation of TAPI, construction of a proposed
U.S.$40B gas pipeline from Russia to India via Central
Asia and China, and expansion of CASA-1000 and the
International North-South Transit Corridor (INSTC),
among other projects, is critical. It would help India,
the sixth-largest energy consumer, become a magnet
for regional resources and a source of exports for the
entire post-Soviet space, while unleashing its strategic
potential as an emerging great power.
According to India’s former Minister of State for
External Affairs Shri Ahamed, the “connect” policy is
based on proactive political, economic, and people-topeople engagement with Central-South Asian countries, both individually and collectively. As part of the
policy, India announced plans to set up 14 flight links
with Central Asian states; develop local IT, energy,
banking, and pharmaceutical industries; and build
energy infrastructure and e-networks linking Central
and South Asia.50 Delhi also planned on establishing
a new Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement with the region.51 The policy, which seeks to
promote new and expand existing connections with
the region, should contribute to India’s foreign policy
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objectives, both regional and global. As former secretary at India’s Ministry of External Affairs Rajiv Sikri
put it:
India would like to encourage the development of
stable and secular regimes in Central Asia, lest weakened, unstable states with centrifugal tendencies become bases for terrorist, separatist, and fundamentalist elements, which could link up with counterparts
in Afghanistan and Pakistan. . . . India seeks to have
a firm foothold and exercise influence in Central Asia
along with other great powers so that this strategically
located region does not become an area dominated by
forces inimical or hostile to India’s interests. . . . Aspiring to be an influential global power, India has to
be a player in the unfolding ‘Great Game’ in Central
Asia, in an equal footing with the other major players
like the United States, Russia, and China if it is to successfully protect its vital national interests in Central
Asia.52

But Delhi is far from attaining an “equal footing”
on par with Moscow or Beijing. The “connect” policy
does not pursue an explicit military or security initiative focused on Central Asia. It further lacks effective
multilateral and bilateral frameworks of cooperation
with the region. This does not mean India is not trying. India is a member of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures—the only
organization having India and Central Asian states as
members.53 It would also like the regional states to become members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in either the existing or
a separate framework, while seeking membership in
the SCO. Delhi has also been cultivating security and
military ties with Central Asian states. It has found in
Tashkent its major arms supplier and tried but failed
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to establish an airbase at Ayni in Tajikistan, which it
helped refurbish. It also assisted with training of the
Kazakh Caspian fleet, opened a mountain biomedical
research center, and participated in counterterrorism
exercises with Kyrgyz Special Forces in Kyrgyzstan
for the first time in 2015. Finally, India has cooperated
with Central Asian states on stabilization of Afghanistan. But Russia’s traditional and China’s emerging
security presence and role present major obstacles
to India’s efforts to establish its own security and
military foothold in the region.
While Russia has beat India in the race for military
bases and geopolitical influence, China has outdone
it in the race for markets and geo-economics presence—a sphere of activity that forms an overwhelming component of India’s “Connect Central Asia”
policy. In 2013, China acquired an 8.4 percent stake
in Kashagan oil field, which Kazakhstan had previously promised to sell to India for the same amount of
U.S.$5B.The deal was one of 20 bilateral agreements
worth U.S.$30B. India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) is currently attempting to buy out ConocoPhilips’ 8.4 percent stake in the Kashagan oil field.54
Beijing also outperformed Delhi in securing rights to
develop the Galkynysh gas field in Turkmenistan and
is launching a pipeline in 2009 to supply Turkmen gas
to China. Beijing and Astana further opened a second
pipeline to bring Kazakh oil to China. Finally, China
has invested far more resources in the region’s transit infrastructure, while boosting its economic presence in Afghanistan where it more visibly competes
with India.
Before India launched its “connect” policy, it established intergovernmental commissions for trade, economic, scientific, and technical cooperation with the
regional republics.55 But it has attained only limited
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gains. In 2014, 2 years after it launched its “connect”
policy, India’s trade with the region stood at approximately U.S.$1.24B compared to China’s at U.S.$50B.
The same year, India’s exports and imports to the Central Asian region constituted less than 2 percent and
1.5 percent of its overall exports and imports on average, respectively. India largely imports cotton, raw
materials, zinc, uranium, iron, steel, and dried fruits
from the region, while exporting tea, textiles, leather,
rice, pharmaceuticals, IT technologies, and chemical
products.56 This is why implementing TAPI, constructing the gas pipeline from Russia to India, expanding
CASA-1000, and broadening INSTC is the priority for
the “connect” policy. After all, cooperation between
India and Central Asian republics is especially promising in the energy and transit development sphere,
given the lack of transit infrastructure between Central and South Asia and India’s limited presence in
the region’s energy market. As of 2011, India was not
even on the list of top 10 countries involved in the oil
and gas exploitation in Central Asia.57
The TAPI gas pipeline project, estimated to cost
U.S.$10B, would reduce India’s dependence on energy
imports from the Middle East, facilitate improvement
in Indo-Pakistani ties, and advance development and
integration of Afghanistan with the broader region.
It would also challenge EEU’s energy interests in the
Caspian, undermine Russia’s grip over the region’s
energy exports, and help the Central Asian states diversify their ties to balance China. But the TAPI participants have failed to kick-start the project for financial and security reasons ever since the idea originally
came up in 1995-96, despite making significant progress recently. The parties plan to start the construction
of the pipeline in 2015 with a view to make it operational by 2020.
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Construction of the gas pipeline extending from
Russia via Central Asia to China and then to India is
another proposal India has been advancing to facilitate
its resource acquisition strategy in Russia and Central
Asia. The pipeline would transport gas from Russia
via Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan to
Kashgar in China’s Xingjian, before crossing into India via Ladakh or Himachal Pradesh.58 However, the
project faces technical, financial, and geopolitical challenges and is subject to the resolution of territorial disputes and mitigation of Sino-Russian and Sino-Indian
rivalries for Eurasian resources and trade. The interest of Russia and Central Asian states in the project,
Russia’s overall leverage vis-à-vis China, and Beijing’s
own interest in expanding its gas imports offer some
prospects for implementation of this proposal.
The CASA-1000, in turn, is already operational
but could be expanded to increase electricity exports
to Pakistan and India. As TAPI, it would bring India
and Pakistan closer together, if not politically then at
least economically, to ensure they are on a sustainable
development path and are not a significant source of
security threats for neighbors. As an Indian observer
noted, any electricity lines extending from Central
Asia via the Wakhan corridor would probably traverse areas of Kashmir occupied by Pakistan and India, making the Line of Control increasingly irrelevant
as parties expand electricity and other types of trade.59
Besides financial challenges, the project confronts a
limited electricity production capacity of Tajikistan
and Kyrgyzstan in the short to medium term, as well
as opposition of downstream Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan to required dam construction
in the two upstream countries that the downstream
states fear would deprive them of even more water
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resources. Delhi also has to face an emerging role of
China as its rival for electricity imports, as Beijing
seeks to import Central Asian electricity to develop its
lagging regions of Xingjian and Tibet. India and China
should approach the issue of importing the region’s
electricity with an eye to mitigate the potential for interstate conflict, in the same way they should in the
case of oil and gas imports from Central Asia.
The INSTC, launched by Russia, India, and Iran in
2000, is already partly operational but is yet to be finalized and should be expanded to include Central Asian
states and Afghanistan, and potentially Pakistan and
China, if India wants its reconnection with Central
Asia to occur sooner rather than later. Kazakhstan,
Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan in Central Asia, as well
as Armenia and Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus,
among other countries, joined the project and are considering ways to tap into the initiative advancing sea,
rail, and land connections between India, Iran, Russia,
and Europe. India helped with the construction of the
Zaranj-Delaram and Zaranj-Milak roads linking Iran
and Afghanistan but should link and expand them as
part of the INSTC.60
The isolation of Iran due to the standoff between
Tehran and Washington and India’s tensions with
China and Pakistan—besides challenges presented by
geography or nonstate actors—have impeded these
four geopolitically monumental projects. This is despite the argument that implementation of the initiatives would help address these very challenges. For
now, Delhi is leveraging its economic ties with partner
countries to advance these projects and to increase its
overall presence in Central Asia irrespective of their
implementation.
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In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, India is involved in
hydropower development initiatives. It also plans to
open an Indian-Central Asia university and a military
hospital in the two countries, respectively. In Uzbekistan, India is present in the pharmaceuticals, IT, construction, energy, and mining sectors. In Kazakhstan,
its firms are actively involved in coal, oil, and uranium industries. From 2009-14, India imported more
than 3,500 tons of uranium from Kazakhstan. Delhi is
also interested in building a gas pipeline from southern Kazakhstan and has boosted its engagement with
Iran, given a potential détente between Tehran and
the West.61 But instability in Pakistan and Afghanistan and Tehran’s unresolved standoff with the West
have hampered its efforts to import energy resources via proposed TAPI and Iran-Pakistan-India gas
pipelines.62
But India’s main focus as part of the “connect”
policy has remained on Afghanistan.63 Over the last
decade, it has invested U.S.$2B in the country’s infrastructure and won rights to develop the Hajigak and
other deposits (Afghanistan’s overall deposits are
estimated at U.S.$1 to 3T). India has even deployed
paramilitary forces in Afghanistan for the first time
to protect its assets and personnel.64 Delhi committed $U.S.100 million (M) to develop the Iranian port
at Chabahar and spent U.S.$136M to connect the port
with Afghanistan’s Ring Road. The port would enable Delhi to access Central Asian markets without
relying on Pakistan and position it favorably vis-àvis China, which helped build a rival Pakistani port
at Gwadar linking China and the Persian Gulf. The
Chabahar port forms a part of the INSTC, designed
to expand a south-north vector of the transcontinental
trade.65 As of 2013, about 60 percent of Afghanistan’s
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trade passed via a road network built by India and
Iran linking Chabahar and Bandar Abbas ports with
Central Asia.66 Besides its funding for roads, railways,
medical facilities, and power networks, India helped
Afghanistan become an SAARC member to facilitate
its development and regional integration.
India is interested in seeing Central Asian states as
members of the SAARC, as well, and more generally
seeks to extend its cooperation frameworks with other
states to Central Asia and the Middle East, including
the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), the Twelfth
Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral Technical
Economic and Cooperation, and the India-Association for Southeast Asian Nations deal.67 It would also
like to see regional republics, especially Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, join SAFTA, which has
Afghanistan as a member and Iran and China as observers.68 SAFTA is an agreement reached in 2004 that
created a free trade zone for an area covering Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and
Sri Lanka with the combined population of 1.8 billion
people. The parties plan to reduce customs duties of
all traded goods to zero by 2016. India and Pakistan
acceded in 2009, while Afghanistan acceded in 2011.
Granted, the “connect” policy is more active than
the “Look North” policy, has more funding, and focuses on Afghanistan’s reconstruction as the key to reconnection of Central and South Asia. It also promises
a more profound involvement of India in the region’s
future in the years and decades ahead. But it is not
without its own challenges. It has no explicit linkage
to the resolution of Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistani
disputes. It does not factor in the role of China, whose
economic expansion can help India remove corks and
unleash its expansion. It also lacks effective multilat-
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eral economic and political mechanisms of engagement with Central Asia in economic and, importantly,
security spheres. The projects that underpin the policy
lack financial means compared to China’s “belt” initiative. Delhi also does not issue checks as easily as
Beijing does and is not fully in the business of securing strategic assets and investments in the region at all
cost. Finally, the policy lacks alignment with similar
strategies of other actors, especially the United States,
which pursues a similar agenda in the region. India
thus should adjust the way of doing business in Central Asia by exploring its prospects of competition and
collaboration with other actors in Central-South Asia
to facilitate its regional position.
External Competition and Cooperation.
India’s relationships with external actors in Central
Asia exhibit competitive and collaborative dynamics.
But its ties with Pakistan and China are not only more
competitive and strained, but also potentially conflict
prone if the parties fail to reach some type of accommodation in the long run.
The Indo-Pakistani rivalry in South Asia is as old
as the two countries themselves. Ever since the independence and partition of India in 1947, Delhi and
Islamabad have jockeyed for territorial integrity, independence, and geopolitical positioning by fighting
four wars (1948-49, 1965, 1971, and 1999); acquiring
nuclear weapons; sponsoring militant and secessionist groups; engaging in trade spats and restrictions;
and seeking financial, diplomatic, and military assistance from other powers. Similarly, the Sino-Indian
competition for power and influence in Asia has been
ongoing since the 1940s when China and India were
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established as modern states.69 India and China, a
close backer of Pakistan, went to war with each other
over disputed territories in 1962.
India’s rivalry with both actors is assuming new
dimensions, with major implications for Eurasian stability. First, China’s rise as a global power and its expanding maritime and continental presence in areas
surrounding India is turning Pakistan, and potentially
Iran, into a primary component of Beijing’s transcontinental resources acquisition strategy and a platform
of power projection along the rimlands and across
Eurasia. This could aggravate the Indo-Pakistani and
Sino-Indian rivalry if Delhi fails to cultivate cooperative dynamics in its relationships with Islamabad and
Beijing. Second, India’s emergence as a global power
and its own expanding maritime and continental presence are prompting Pakistan and China to search for
allies to keep India in check, potentially exacerbating
the Indo-Pakistani and Sino-Indian rivalry, as well.
The projected expansion of India’s and China’s
activities in Central Asia and reconnection of Central and South Asia add a twist to the Indo-Pakistani
and Sino-Indian relationships, to the role of Pakistan
in Beijing’s policy to keep India in check, and to the
role of Pakistan and China in Delhi’s efforts to unlock
India’s strategic potential in Central and South Asia.
Were they to ease tensions, India, Pakistan, and China
could benefit enormously from connectivity initiatives
being advanced throughout Eurasia. Empires that
used to rule over territories now occupied by all three
states had once already extracted major geo-economic
advantages from the Silk Road by facilitating transcontinental circulation of goods and ideas.70 Resolving Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistani border disputes
as major land disputes afflicting Asia would open up
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many of the broader region’s areas that have remained
locked since the middle of the 20th century.71
Implementing and expanding TAPI, CASA-1000,
Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI), INSTC, and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor would demonstrate a great
potential of trilateral cooperation in promoting national and interregional development. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), in its current design,
passes entirely through Pakistan and its governed
area in Kashmir, which India disputes. Turkmenistan
and Kazakhstan may join the IPI in the future. India
could import gas from Russia and/or Central Asia via
Xingjian and the disputed Aksai Chin. It could also
build links with Central Asia via Gilgit, Wakhan, and
Srinagar-Muzaffarabad corridors running via Kashmir if the parties resolve their disputes.72
Currently, China and Pakistan are hesitant to involve India in energy pipeline projects given their
competition for energy resources. Both signed a
U.S.$7B deal to extend the Iran-Pakistan pipeline
northward to China without involving India.73 But
were they to include India, Pakistan and China could
earn transit fees, enhance their trade with India and
the region, and gain leverage over Delhi.74 China and
India already share experience, pursuing joint projects, including in the energy sphere. They bid jointly
for oil stakes and for exploring oil fields in Colombia, Kazakhstan, Sudan, and Iran. They also agreed
to consider exploring jointly gas fields in Indonesia
and Australia.75 Currently, the parties are considering
launching an India-China oil consortium in Central
Asia.76 Both countries further conducted joint searchand-rescue operations off the Shanghai coast in 2003
and anti-terrorism exercises in China in 2007 when
Indian forces set foot on Chinese territory for the first
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time since the 1962 war. More generally, they have
held regular military exercises and exchanged delegations on all issues.77 Besides, China does not perceive
India as a strong competitor in Central Asia,78 providing room for enhanced cooperation between the two
countries in the broader region in the short term.
Addressing lingering issues with Pakistan and
China is key for Delhi’s and Beijing’s less restrained
role in South and Central Asia. While China and India
are bound to be strategic rivals in both regions in the
long term, they have to find ways to cooperate to avoid
conflict and maximize their development potential.
Neither China nor India alone is capable of reformatting the geopolitical field of Eurasia in order to benefit fully from any Eurasian economic development.
But both countries can mitigate and prevent interstate
frictions and conflicts in the continent by emphasizing
collaborative dynamics in their ultimately competitive
bilateral relationship. India needs to push north, while
China is already seeking connections with the Middle
East via Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and, potentially
India to complement east-west links and diversify and
expand its reach.
India’s positive relationship with Iran is also instrumental for advancing transcontinental connections and India’s strategic presence in Central Asia,
especially if Iran and the United States start improving ties. Iran borders energy-rich Turkmenistan and
volatile Pakistan, and shares a cultural heritage with
Tajikistan and India, presenting a number of avenues
of cooperation with Delhi in trade, energy, and security spheres focusing on Central Asia. Delhi has already
boosted its ties with Iran in response to the start of
nuclear talks in 2014 but is yet to tap into Iran’s geopolitical position and capacity to advance its interests
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in Central Asia. India especially eyes Iran’s energy
resources and transit potential but is increasingly concerned about China’s advances in Iran. Beijing has invested U.S.$120B into Iran’s energy sector over the last
4-5 years. As of 2011, Iran was China’s second-largest
oil supplier, accounting for 14 percent of China’s oil
imports.79 An expanding cooperation with Iran enables India to enhance trade with Central Asia and
keep China’s ambitions centered on Iran and Central
Asia in check. Central Asian states are, in turn, interested in engaging Iran but cannot do so in a scalable
way for fear of distancing themselves from Washington and other actors. Iran, in its turn, would like to expand its role in Central-South Asia, while diversifying
its energy exports. Iran and Kazakhstan seek participation in the Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Oman
corridor, while Kazakhstan, Iran, and Turkmenistan
already operate a rail line linking the three countries.80
Iran’s regional advances would ultimately compete
with India’s, but the two would benefit from aligning
their policies to promote their otherwise constrained
engagement in the region in the short to medium term.
India’s ties with Russia are also helpful to India’s
plans in Central Asia but, like any other aspiring hegemon, Russia does not always like to share. Moscow
would be happy, in the words of Vladimir Jirinovsky,
to “wash the boots” in the Indian Ocean, expand the
INSTC, and see Delhi become a member of the SCO to
balance China in Central Asia. Moscow already seeks
to participate in north-south projects backed by the
West, such as TAPI and CASA-1000, to at least shape,
if not control, the reconnection of Central and South
Asia.81 Russia would also like India’s assistance in
diluting U.S. global influence in the quest for a more
multipolar international order.82 But it would not like
India to have a strong role in Central Asia, as its pres51

sure on Dushanbe to prevent Delhi from getting its
first-ever overseas military base at Ayni has demonstrated. Some reports indicate that Moscow’s decision
to block India’s access to the base in Tajikistan was
to “punish” Delhi for trying to diversify its weapons
suppliers.83 But the alleged punishment may be one
aspect of Russia’s general opposition to India’s military role in Central Asia. Delhi’s best bet is to cultivate
ties with Russia, exploit Moscow’s concerns about
China’s rise, and leverage Russia’s regional position
to advance its interests in Central Asia.
But it is Delhi’s evolving relationship with Washington that portends major global and regional implications, especially if it assumes a strategic character
with a focus on Central Asia. India is already a counterbalancer against China, a role the United States
welcomes and a role that is autonomous rather than
subordinate to U.S. global interests. As Mohan argues,
“India has never waited for American permission to
balance [against] China,” and has been doing so since
China’s invasion of Tibet.84 Increasingly, Delhi and
Washington face a need to work together in Central,
South, and East Asia. Washington has also sought to
promote integration of the broader region as part of
the NSRS, which is overlapping with India’s “connect”
policy. Both policies focus on reconstruction, integration, and positioning of Afghanistan as the integrating bridge between Central and South Asia, seeking to
create a common energy market in Central-South Asia
by advancing TAPI, CASA-1000, and other initiatives,
while providing a platform for the Central Asian and
South Asian republics to pursue southward vectors
of development. Not least important are shared challenges facing both the NSRS and the “connect” policy,
which should prompt Delhi and Washington to cooperate in advancing their regional influence.
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But Delhi and Washington have legitimate reservations about engaging one another in Central Asia.
India continues to oppose U.S. perceived unilateralism in a quest for a more just and multipolar order,
is not willing to be perceived as a U.S. pawn, is concerned about disrupting its ties with other emerging
and established powers seeking to keep Washington
in check, and is generally held back by the legacy of
its nonalignment foreign policy tradition. The United
States, on the other hand, risks undermining its ties
with China and Russia and escalating external rivalries in Central Asia. It could also facilitate dynamics
that would deprive the EEU of potential energy imports, which will be increasingly diverted to Southeast Asia, and potentially exacerbate conflict-prone
competition over influence and resources in the
Central Asian region.
Examining India’s relationships with external actors sheds light on challenges and opportunities of
India’s current and future engagement with Central
Asia. But no less important are India’s relationships
with individual countries of Central Asia, as they are
only starting to shape up.
Regional Views and Areas of Engagement.
Potential areas of engagement between India and
Central Asia are profound, especially because India
lacks effective and meaningful bilateral and multilateral mechanisms of engagement with Central Asia.85
But the parties need to do a lot of homework to realize
this engagement.
Central Asian states welcome India’s regional
presence for a number of reasons. India is not only
an aspiring great power—itself a major consideration
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for the regional countries located in its immediate periphery. It is still a developing nation that has shown
great achievements in economic growth and does not
seek to impose its will or way of development on others. It also remains a democratic and secular nation,
respectful of diversity and numerous ethnic and religious groups that are more optimistic about India’s
future than they were about 2 decades ago when India embarked on economic reforms. Central Asians
do believe India can offer a model of development
in the short term that could compete with Russia’s
or China’s. But they consider India’s successful economic development as a source of inspiration for the
regional economies and populations that are eager to
connect with South Asian neighbors and the world.
As a potential great power, India offers regional
republics an opportunity to ride the wave of development faster and counter ambitions of grandeur emanating from Moscow, Beijing, Ankara, or Tehran. Central Asian states cannot disregard this opportunity,
not when outside parties seek to test or project their
models of development in Central Asia.86 Provided
the regional states start building links with one of the
fastest growing economies (and potentially the largest) early on, they can tap into opportunities projected
to spring up from these connections. Deepening the
economic linkages would enable the regional economies to integrate with their neighbors to the south.
Delhi’s more substantive economic engagement
would translate into geopolitical leverage that the regional countries can use to balance external pressures
from actors that once hosted the largest empires and
continue to be active geopolitical actors on the Eurasian chessboard. India also offers the regional states a
platform of technological cooperation as an important
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attribute of modernization for the regional economies.
India is actively positioning itself as a technology
power capable of overcoming geopolitical constraints
in the broader region and is seeking to build for itself
a regional presence worthy of a modern, 21st century
power. In Central Asia, it has opened several technology centers, largely in in the information sector.87
Central Asian countries and India share not only
history, but also culture and religion going back hundreds of years. This cultural connection remained
alive somewhat even during the Soviet times when
India was one of only four countries allowed to have
a consulate in the Soviet Central Asia.88 India is also
home to the second largest population of Muslims,
many of whom practice a Sufi tradition of Islam predominantly practiced in Central Asia. What is more,
Muslim countries of Central Asia prefer a stronger
presence of India rather than Pakistan, being concerned as they are about fundamentalist and terrorist
movements from Pakistan seeking to undermine the
political and social fabric of the regional states and societies. They view Islamabad with suspicion, given its
role in aiding the Mujahedeen in the fight against the
Soviet Union and Pakistan’s perceived inaction vis-àvis terrorist groups that originated in Central Asia but
are now based in Pakistan, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. The regional states also share the
memory of China’s control of part of the region in the
past89 and welcome India’s role to offset Beijing’s current economic expansion in the region. Yet, India’s
perception of the regional states sympathizing with a
Sharia-ruled Pakistan, its preoccupation with rivalries
with Pakistan and China, and its inward looking policies since the 1990s have misframed its policy, making
it assume a “belated, slow, and half-hearted stand”
toward Central Asia.90
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As India continues its rise and Central Asian states
continue their quest for external integration, more
room for collaboration between the parties is expected
in the coming years. While the stabilization, development, and regional integration of Afghanistan will remain a key pillar of their cooperation, other promising
areas include energy, trade, and transit facilitation;
defense collaboration; space programs development;
and external balancing. Of all these areas, energy cooperation is a major priority for India, whose oil and
gas imports are forecast to increase to 90 percent and
40 percent, respectively, by 2020 in order to meet the
country’s projected energy demand.91
Turkmenistan is a major prospective energy partner for India, while Delhi is an emerging vector of
balancing against China’s growing presence in Turkmenistan’s energy market and Russia’s traditionally
strong security role in the Caspian. Delhi views Turkmenistan as a critical component of its energy import
diversification strategy, especially after India’s ONGCMittal acquired 30 percent of shares of two oil sites in
the Caspian in 2007 but withdrew from the projects
in 2010 citing “exploratory failures.”92 The construction of TAPI would be a major milestone, not only for
India and Turkmenistan but also for Afghanistan and
Pakistan, which suffer from lack of security and face
potential disintegration. India would have a source of
energy resources from Central Asia and a major infrastructural connection with the region, which would
entail a much more expanded and dynamic economic
presence of India in the region’s market. Turkmenistan would diversify its energy exports, this time not
just vis-à-vis Russia but also China, which has recently
replaced Russia as the largest Turkmen gas importer.
Afghanistan and Pakistan, in turn, would tap into the
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region’s energy inflows to power their economies and
help ensure sustainable economic development that
promotes regional stability.
Uzbekistan and India, in turn, have a lot of ground
to cover in the areas of gas and uranium exploration,
defense cooperation, transit infrastructure development, and external balancing. India is already engaged in the joint exploration and exploitation of gas
fields and construction of liquid gas and oil factories
in Uzbekistan,93 but more room exists for cooperation
in this sphere. India looks to Uzbekistan to diversify
sources of uranium imports and to boost cooperation
in arms production—critical ingredients for India’s
expanding nuclear capability and emerging indigenous arms industry. Delhi also considers Uzbekistan
the key platform of transit connections in the region.
Uzbekistan borders all Central Asian states and Afghanistan and has major rail and highways passing
through its territory.94 But instability in Afghanistan
and measures by the Uzbek regime to close down the
country to its own citizens, neighbors, and the world
has hampered the bilateral transit infrastructure development cooperation, even if Tashkent and Delhi
could pursue a meaningful collaboration to integrate
Afghanistan with Central-South Asia. Despite its central location, Uzbekistan has largely kept itself aloof
from the rest of Central Asia and preferred bilateral
rather than multilateral engagement.95 This partly explains why India has increasingly viewed Kazakhstan
as its platform in Central Asia.96 Tashkent would like
to see India alongside other Southeast Asian states to
balance Russia and China. But until the parties expand
their political engagement, this prospect is far off.
As Central Asia’s largest economy, Kazakhstan
presents significant opportunities for cooperation
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with India in oil and gas exploration, uranium production, trade facilitation, space programs development, and strategic balancing. Access to oil, gas, and
uranium is critical for India, which depends heavily
on uninterrupted imports of these strategic resources
from overseas. But India’s energy presence is confined to “ancillary activities”97 and is yet to expand.
In 2009-10, Videsh Limited got a 25 percent stake in
the Satpayev block for the first time since 1995, when
India started seeking a foothold in Kazakhstan’s energy sector.98 India also looks to expand trade with
Kazakhstan, which accounts for 75 percent of India’s
trade with the region. But the creation of the EEU and
the potential creation of a free trade zone between the
EEU and China could complicate India’s efforts unless
it manages to develop a similar arrangement.
Space development is emerging as a major pillar of
India-Kazakh cooperation. India is interested in creating a landing space, utilizing a radar complex, and
using Kazakhstan’s territory for launching its remote
sensing satellite rockets. Astana, in turn, is interested
in India’s space development program to develop that
of its own, eyeing the expertise of a technology center in Bangalore and the possibility of expanding its
satellite launching clients.99 Especially crucial to Astana is a potential platform provided by India to keep
Kazakhstan’s two large neighbors in check as part of
its praised multivector policy. Russia and China impact Kazakhstan’s evolution as an independent and
resource-rich state, which is the largest (by territory)
in the post-Soviet space after Russia, making Delhi a
key partner for Kazakhstan. Both countries are also
rapidly developing and emerging as leaders in their
regions, seeking a status of modern and technological
powers.
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India’s cooperation with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is largely about access to hydro resources, trade
facilitation, defense cooperation, and gaining military
presence in the two countries. The hydro potential
of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is immense and presents major opportunities for India’s engagement in
the production and export of electricity as part of
CASA-1000. Trade facilitation and education are other prospective areas, but they remain limited for the
time being.
Defense and military cooperation, however, is
emerging as an important pillar, with Delhi seeking to
establish military presence and stronger military-tomilitary ties with both countries. In Kyrgyzstan, India
eyes a torpedo production plant and torpedo testing
site in northern Kyrgyzstan,100 besides opening a biomedical military research facility and holding Special
Forces exercises in 2015 for the first time. In Tajikistan,
it refurbished a military hospital at Farkor military
facility and a runway at Ayni military base, cooperating with Dushanbe against the Taliban in the 1900s
and since 2001. Tajikistan borders Afghanistan, China,
and Pakistan along the Wakhan corridor, making the
country important to India’s military contingencies.101
India’s bet on Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to advance its military presence in Central Asia is not coincidental. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are weaker and
have less room for autonomous foreign policy compared to their larger and richer neighbors. But even
here, India’s moves could be too little, too late due to
Russia’s substantial military presence in both countries. Still, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan remain interested in boosting security and economic collaboration
with India, considering it an evolving partner in their
external balancing strategies. Moreover, India has
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viewed Tajikistan as a platform to enhance the bilateral framework of its engagement with Central Asian
republics,102 while looking to Kazakhstan to boost its
overall regional presence.
Prospects for engagement between India and
Central Asian republics clearly exist. But until they
address instability in Afghanistan and, to a lesser degree, volatility in Pakistan, their reconnection is going
to be slow, ineffective, and painful. As they ponder
these hard questions, they should necessarily factor in
the challenges and opportunities presented by the two
unstable countries and minimize the likely fallout in
the form of expanded flows of refugees, terrorism, and
narcotrafficking due to reconnection of Central and
South Asia. Cultivating relations is itself a difficult undertaking when you are starting from a low base, but
doing so in the conditions of instability in neighboring
countries that are linking Central and South Asia is
a significant challenge, requiring India to search for
allies in the region to shore up its regional presence.
Search for Partners as Strategic Imperative.
Identifying and working with partner(s) in advancing its presence in Central Asia is a strategic imperative for India if it wants to establish a more prominent
presence in the region similar to other great powers.
Given numerous limitations on its ambitions, Delhi
should advance cooperation with its perceived rivals, such as China and Pakistan, and actors that it
views as its prospective strategic partners, such as the
United States. However, the premise of this work is
that a closer partnership with Washington in particular would help India overcome these limitations and
better achieve its agenda. Building such a partnership
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and advancing its regional presence is a challenge for
Delhi. It faces major constraints inherent in its strategic culture and foreign policies, hampering its ability
to promote influence globally and regionally. But failure to accomplish related tasks risks delaying significantly India’s rise or making India fall further behind.
As a potential great power, India is losing out to
all other great powers in the region, including Russia,
China, the EEU, and the United States. It also finds
itself struggling to compete with actors as middleand small-ranked as Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, and Iran. Perceptions of its potential
emergence as a great power notwithstanding, India
remains a middle-ranked power confronting a whole
range of internal challenges that will likely preoccupy
it for at least the next 1 to 2 decades before it can turn
itself into a major global power. To make this transition faster, India needs partners to help it enhance
its presence in Central Asia and beyond. Otherwise,
its expansion as a great power will proceed primarily
along the rimlands of Eurasia.
Unlike Russia, China, and the United States, India
starts from a lower base of engagement with the region since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This is despite India’s relatively substantial economic presence
in Afghanistan, where Pakistan’s involvement has
long defined India’s policies that are only now starting to be proactive, go beyond India’s obsession with
Pakistan, and reflect Delhi’s appreciation of Afghanistan’s role as an interregional integrator. It also faces
major economic and social development constraints
that keep its energies focused on internal rather than
regional challenges and opportunities, which are both
restricting and facilitating its expansion as a great
power. Moreover, India does not have as much cash
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as China to throw around and has a lot to do at home
first. Partnering with other actors on a strategic level
could open doors to financial, diplomatic, and military support India needs to achieve its objectives.
India also does not border Central Asia directly,
having to lean on the unstable Afghanistan and somewhat isolated Iran to access the region. The instability in Afghanistan and uncertainty surrounding the
potential for détente between Iran and the West leave
many doors closed for Delhi, both in terms of its bilateral relations with these countries and in terms of its
engagement with Central Asian republics. Were these
two issues addressed, India would be in a more geopolitically favorable position to advance its “connect”
policy and escape the confines of South Asia. Partnering with a democrat great power that not only has
access to Central Asia but is also capable of influencing outcomes related to the evolution of Afghanistan
and Iran is key to India’s active foreign policy toward
Central-South Asia and the Greater Middle East.
Further, India has strained ties with nucleararmed Pakistan and unresolved border tensions with
nuclear-armed China—the neighboring countries
with which it has fought a number of wars. Positioned
between Pakistan and China in power rankings, India
finds it hard to change the status quo alone. Having
a partner capable of influencing China and Pakistan
could give India a chance to attempt a change in its
relations with the two neighbors. Otherwise, the tensions will continue to prevent India from pursuing a
more active regional and interregional role in CentralSouth Asia. India and China should both be interested in normalization of their relations and stability
in the broader region—a major imperative for their
unimpeded emergence as great powers.

62

Finally, India is stuck in the mind frame of its nonalignment tradition, which is potentially detrimental
to its projected standing as the largest economy and a
major military power in the decades ahead. While it is
rightly avoiding a strategic partnership bordering on
exclusivity and an antagonistic relationship toward
outsiders, it is missing opportunities to join forces
or align policies with actor(s) that could advance its
influence where it is severely lacking. India still has
that opportunity and should consider the benefits
and challenges that such a partnership could generate for its global and regional positions. If it views
Washington as a potential partner, it needs to address
a domestic political discourse viewing the West as the
colonizer, which is associated with its nonalignment
tradition and struggle against colonialism.103 India
would need to address related constraints inherent
in its strategic culture and foreign policy, in the same
way Washington would need to imbue with more
substance its cooperation with Delhi. After all, only in
the aftermath of India’s 1998 nuclear test did the U.S.
engagement with India start to assume a serious diplomatic outreach rather than predominantly a military
collaboration.104
Developing a strategically closer partnership with
the United States could be key for India’s future global
and regional role as a great power. As India, the United States faces a number of challenges projecting its
influence globally and in Central Asia. But it also has
a number of attributes making it a desirable partner
for India on the world stage and in the region. Both
are democracies and dynamic powers, concerned
about China’s rise, Russia’s resurgence, and stability
of Central-South Asian countries facing external pressures and domestic challenges ranging from the lack

63

of economic development to the lack of democratic
experience. Both seek a peaceful power transition
from the “West to the rest.” Washington increasingly
views Delhi as a trustworthy actor that could help it
retain its leading position in the world. India, in turn,
increasingly considers the United States as a platform
for its advancement as a great power.
More and more, India relies on the United States
to provide it with latest defense technology and organizational models to develop its arms industry and
economic processes.105 In 2005, Delhi and Washington
concluded a 10-year-long defense partnership deal allowing for sale of U.S. ballistic missile defense systems
and fourth-generation fighter aircraft to India.106 More
recently, they signed an additional nuclear agreement,
despite India not being a member of the NPT. Both are
now increasingly viewing their cooperation as a key
pillar of global and regional stability, conducting joint
military exercises and expanding their economic and
security cooperation. Both are pursuing similar yet
constrained agendas of integrating Afghanistan into
Central-South Asia and reconnecting the two regions
by supporting geopolitically monumental projects,
such as TAPI and CASA-1000, as part of the NSRS and
the “connect” policy. Along with Kabul, they further
agreed to hold trilateral consultations on promoting
Afghanistan’s development.107 But the reality is that
neither the NSRS nor the “connect” policy is capable
of achieving set objectives faster and more effectively
than a closer alignment of policies and engagement
between Delhi and Washington designed to generate
policy synergies in the wider region.
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IV: UNLOCKING AND LEVERAGING INDIA’S
REGIONAL POTENTIAL
Regardless of whether India and the United States
enter a strategic partnership agreement focused explicitly on Central Asia, they can start, separately or
in concert, executing the following objectives to unlock India’s potential and enabling Washington to enhance its own: mitigating Af-Pak security challenges;
shaping Iran’s geopolitical role; fostering Sino-Indian
cooperation; and exploiting grand strategies and
regional connectivity initiatives of other actors.
Mitigating Af-Pak Security Challenges.
Support India’s Reconstruction Effort and Military
Involvement in Afghanistan.
Both Washington and Delhi focus on Afghanistan
as the node of interregional reconnection, reinforcing
the imperative of putting Afghanistan on the track
of stable development. China’s growing presence,
India’s lack of resources but a strong intent to play
a bigger role, and the U.S. withdrawal but a strong
desire to shape Afghanistan’s future make it a major
task. Washington and Delhi should develop and pursue joint economic, political, and military operations
and projects to support Afghanistan’s reconstruction
and external integration. The parties should upgrade
the trilateral consultations (Kabul, Delhi, Washington)
by advancing joint and coordinated rather than individual consultations-based action in both economic
and military spheres.
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Shape Sustainable Political and Military Base in Kabul
Favorable to Delhi.
Washington should use freed-up resources after
the withdrawal from Afghanistan to shape a sustainable political and military base in Kabul favorable
to Delhi. The military’s contribution to this effort is
crucial, given its pronounced role in the U.S. overall strategy in Afghanistan. The U.S. military should
leave behind a military presence and influence sufficient to pursue redefined U.S. objectives in the region; support Afghan security and military capacity;
enhance Delhi’s military presence in Afghanistan; and
advance U.S.-Indian military collaboration in CentralSouth Asia to complement their growing maritime
military cooperation. The U.S. military should leverage its military engagement with India in Afghanistan
as a platform to develop India’s military intervention
capabilities and advance interoperability between
U.S. and Indian forces. After all, the U.S. military may
support, directly or indirectly, India’s military operations or pursue its own military missions in both
Afghanistan and the region in the future. In the process, Washington should mitigate Delhi’s perceptions
of U.S. bias toward Pakistan and encourage deeper
U.S.-Indian military cooperation in Afghanistan with
a view to expand it to military and other domains in
their relations with other states in Central-South Asia.
Enhance Military-to-Military Counterterrorism and
Counternarcotics Cooperation.
The reconnection of South Asia with Central Asia
increasingly requires transnational cooperation in
fighting terrorism and narcotrafficking. This task
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is critical, considering the role of Afghanistan and
Pakistan as hotbeds of homegrown and transnational
narcotrafficking and terrorist networks and the potential of the Islamic State (IS) to build its capabilities in
Central-South Asia. The U.S. military and intelligence
services should pursue enhanced collaboration with
Indian, Pakistani, and Central Asian counterparts
to tackle both threats. In case of improved ties with
Iran, U.S. and Indian militaries should tap into Iran’s
resources in the fight against IS in Afghanistan and
Central-South-Asia. In the process, the U.S. military
should carve out a stand-alone platform of military
cooperation between the United States and India focused specifically on Central Asia, not just Afghanistan. Working through a prospective partner that has
only limited strategic potential in Central Asia, such
as India, may allow the U.S military to advance its
goals in Central Asia with less resistance from Russia.
Moscow has long perceived U.S. efforts to advance
counternarcotics and counterterrorist cooperation
in the region as a ploy by Washington to promote a
stronger military presence in Russia’s backyard.
Encourage Af-Pak-Indo Trilateral Economic Cooperation.
Indo-Pakistani tensions remain a major obstacle
in reintegrating Central and South Asia, as well as in
stimulating intraregional integration in South Asia.
In addition to supporting TAPI and CASA-1000, the
United States and India should advance trilateral projects in the energy, trade, and transit spheres. Unlocking trade between Pakistan and India would contribute to reconstruction and development of countries in
South Asia, while boosting trade from and to Central
Asia and enhancing interregional connectivity. Wash-
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ington and Delhi should actively lobby Kabul and
Islamabad to facilitate the implementation and expansion of the Pakistan-Afghanistan Trade and Transit
Agreement, specifically as it concerns the enabling of
access for India to export goods to Afghanistan via
Pakistani territory and the potential involvement of
India in the deal in a more expanded, region-wide
framework. The role of the U.S. military in the process
should rest on the task of advancing confidence-building measures and common understanding of security
challenges and opportunities, with a view to support
civilian efforts. It should rely on military exercises and
educational exchanges in both bilateral and, ideally,
trilateral frameworks of military-to-military engagement to promote related objectives.
Facilitate Resolution of Conflict in Kashmir.
The conflict in Kashmir plagues Indo-Pakistani and
Sino-Indian relations, leaving room for escalation that
could involve parties beyond the three nuclear-armed
powers. It also continues to damage the prospects of
national and regional development when pressures
for connectivity are only bound to rise, as India and
China rapidly expand their economic reach. Washington and Delhi should put the issue of resolving the
Kashmir conflict on a high agenda in order to reduce
regional tensions and increase prospects of regional
collaboration. As part of this effort, the U.S. military
should develop a better understanding of regional security and economic challenges and their implications
for military strategies of concerned powers. It should
also develop contingency and special forces operations scenarios in case of conflict escalation, while undertaking initiatives aimed at promoting confidence-
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building measures, deescalating hostile rhetoric,
decreasing militarization, and advancing border management cooperation involving India, Pakistan, and
China. It should further work with civilian agencies
within the U.S. Government to promote a mutually
beneficial border regime in the region as a short-term
arrangement, allowing for transcontinental commerce
to flourish once again. Looking long-term, the United
States and India should work with China, Pakistan,
and the people of Kashmir to facilitate a long-term,
durable arrangement in the region. In a situation so
complex, Kashmir’s independence could be a logical,
simple, and eventually acceptable solution to the puzzle that has long kept the three nuclear-armed powers
on their toes.
Advance India’s Geopolitical and Geo-economic
Profile in Tajikistan.
India’s growing involvement in Afghanistan is a
welcome development, but Delhi should also cultivate another node of connectivity, this time in Central Asia proper. While Afghanistan represents such
a connectivity node on the northwestern tip of South
Asia threatened by instability, Tajikistan represents
such a connectivity hub on the southeastern tip of
Central Asia threatened by separatism, regionalism,
and cross-border militancy. Bordering Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and China and dependent on security assistance from Russia and economic aid from China,
Tajikistan offers India a platform to reconnect Central
and South Asia along the south-north axis, but only if
Tajikistan remains whole and integrated from within
and without. Washington should foster quadrilateral
economic and military cooperation involving Afghan-
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istan, Tajikistan, India, and the United States. As part
of this framework, the U.S. military should strive for
enhanced military collaboration with Dushanbe and
encourage the Tajikistani military to pursue expanded
military cooperation with India. The U.S. and Indian
military engagement with Tajikistan should advance
Tajikistani military capacity to defend the country’s
borders, given the threat of cross-border militancy
from Afghanistan. They should also promote more
effective counternarcotics and counterterrorism programs specific to Tajikistan, including as part of military exercises in bilateral and trilateral settings.
Shaping Iran’s Geopolitical Role.
Making Iran a Regional Balancer: Welcoming
India’s Role in Iran and Central Asia.
The 2014-15 P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the
United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany)
nuclear talks and new geopolitical and geo-economic dynamics and imperatives over recent years have
facilitated prospects for a détente between Iran and
the United States, which may well evolve into a strategic relationship between Tehran and Washington,
potentially within the next 2 decades. Shaping Iran’s
geopolitical role, set to expand considerably in case of
the détente, is critical for Washington and Delhi, given
the dynamism displayed by other powers in Eurasia,
such as Turkey, Russia, and especially China. Washington and India should ensure that they are a part
of Iran’s evolution, not its demise. With that in mind,
they should start thinking about how to shape Iran’s
role as a future regional balancer jointly, which would
welcome India’s expanding role in Iran and Central
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Asia and help maintain a balance of power in the
Middle East. Specifically, they should identify ways
in which Tehran’s geopolitical role can be helpful in
advancing their interests in Central Asia, including
as they relate to other powers and the fight against
transnational terrorism and narcotrafficking. In the
military sphere, and in the conditions of a U.S.-Iranian
détente, the U.S. military should encourage the expansion of Indo-Iranian cooperation in Afghanistan,
Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf. The U.S. military
should stand ready to calibrate its own infrastructure
in Eurasia and leverage Iran’s military capabilities to
pursue new logistical and operational objectives in a
transformed geopolitical environment of the Greater
Middle East. By adjusting its military infrastructure
requirements, the U.S. military can dedicate its resources to new missions and goals as they relate to
China’s and Russia’s military infrastructure advances
in Central-South Asia, the Caspian, the Persian Gulf,
and the Indian and Pacific oceans.
Advance U.S.-Iranian and Indo-Iranian Energy, Trade,
and Transit Cooperation.
As does India, the United States faces an assertive
China, which is invested heavily in energy-rich Iran
and seeks to bring Tehran into its fold as part of its
“belt” initiative, especially once all sanctions are removed and China finds itself on a shopping spree.
Washington and Delhi are either not present in Iran or
are far behind China. Meanwhile, the United States,
India, and Iran are all somewhat isolated from Central and South Asia, despite immense opportunities
for trilateral engagement. Where possible, the parties
should identify potential opportunities of coopera-
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tion early on to obtain and retain whatever advantage
they can in case of a U.S.-Iranian nuclear deal and détente. In the process, Washington and Delhi should
act on Iran’s concerns about China’s dominance in
the country’s energy sector and advance their presence in Iran’s economy to facilitate their policies in the
Middle East and Central Asia, where Iran will expand
its presence in case of a U.S.-Iranian détente. As India and Iran start to build new and expand existing
links with regional countries, cooperating with each
other, including as part of IPI, will prove beneficial.
But whatever economic links they pursue, the parties
should ensure that proper security arrangements are
in place to facilitate the development and expansion
of such connections. The role of the U.S. military in
developing combined military contingencies, advancing common understanding with Indian and Iranian
militaries, and deterring state and nonstate actors
from targeting this infrastructure would be crucial,
especially during crises and armed conflicts involving
regional partners and rivals.
Encourage Indo-Iranian Cooperation in Reconstruction
of Afghanistan.
Iran is not only a key to integration of India with
Central Asia. It is also a crucial link in Delhi’s reconnection with the Greater Middle East. Bordering Afghanistan in the east, sharing a cultural heritage with
Afghanistan, and given the history of its support to
U.S. objectives in Kabul and interest in expanding
its reach in case of improved ties with the West, Iran
could represent a major asset to the United States and
India. Its role, channeled in circumstances of growing
strategic collaboration between Tehran and Washing-

72

ton, could promote U.S. and Indian interests and policies in Afghanistan and Central-South Asia. Neither
party benefits from destabilization in Afghanistan,
where they pursue reconstruction efforts. India and
Iran already seek to expand energy and trade ties with
each other via Afghanistan as part of their economic
policies toward Central Asia. Washington should support the Indo-Iranian collaboration aimed at stabilization and integration of Afghanistan into Eurasia by
advancing trilateral economic and counterterrorism
collaboration focused on Afghanistan, Central Asia,
and the Middle East. In the process, and in the conditions of a U.S.-Iranian detente, the U.S. military should
share intelligence and work with its Iranian and Indian military counterparts in an effort to degrade terrorist and militant networks operating in and out of
the Af-Pak region.
Fostering Sino-Indian Cooperation.
Advance Resolution of Border Disputes
and Demilitarization in Border Areas.
Border disputes strain Sino-Indian ties, impeding
economic linkages not only between the two powers
but also between China and South Asia, on the one
hand, and between India and Central Asia, on the
other. The United States and India should dedicate
more resources to advancing the resolution of SinoIndian border disputes and demilitarization along
the border areas, but without portraying or positioning Washington as an arbiter. The U.S. military’s role
here comes down to the following major tasks: advancing demilitarization in Sino-Indian border areas;
promoting common understanding between Chinese
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and Indian militaries as part of bilateral and trilateral
engagement; holding bilateral or multilateral military
exercises with Central Asian, Chinese, Indian, and
Pakistani armies; promoting educational exchanges;
sharing intelligence and security assessments; and
planning joint and combined contingency operations
in case of conflict escalation in disputed border areas.
Resolving these border disputes would contribute to
normalization of relations between two major Asian
rivals, helping the United States uphold systemic stability. It would also enhance China’s and India’s roles
as interregional economic engines, contributing to
development and integration within Eurasia. The parties could then pursue and expand economic links via
Xingjian and Kashmir more effectively.
Facilitate Joint and Combined Sino-Indian Resource
Acquisition Strategies.
China’s “go global” campaign has achieved a more
active and far-reaching resource acquisition strategy
globally, including in Central Asia. As a country trailing behind, India needs China’s cooperation in select
parts of the world to advance its own resource acquisition strategy. This especially concerns Central Asia, a
region of growing importance to the resource-hungry
Asian giants where Beijing outbids Delhi. Both already
have experience pursuing joint bids to acquire stakes
in oil and gas fields in various parts of the world. But
this experiment is limited, as both countries continue
to perceive each other as long-term strategic rivals.
The United States should encourage Delhi and Beijing to participate in combined resource development,
production, and delivery projects in Central Asia, both
on a diplomatic and financial level. A result is not only
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an enhanced ability for India to access Central Asian
markets, but also an improved and more trustworthy
relationship between India and China as a source of
global stability. At the same time, the U.S. military
should support and encourage Delhi’s incipient efforts to build a regional, and eventually global, military infrastructure to protect its expanding economic
interests and presence around the world. As it does
so, it should focus on identifying common threats and
opportunities for military engagement involving all
three parties so as to lessen the prospect of armed conflict amid the global race for resources and on devising joint political and military approaches to address
crises and conflicts induced by resource scarcity, environmental degradation, and natural disasters.
Stimulate Confidence-Building Measures and
Shared Regional Security Approaches.
The rise of China and India is a source of major
challenges and opportunities for the global and regional security system. As the two countries’ profiles
expand in Central and South Asia, both China and
India should develop confidence-building measures
and shared regional security management approaches. The alternative is a lingering suspicion and potentially explosive conflict between the two countries,
which are only starting to learn the ropes of projecting influence globally in the conditions of the 21st
century. The United States should encourage the two
powers to develop common platforms of cooperation
in Central-South Asia but seek to participate in such
arrangements where practical to prevent an unlikely
but potential emergence of an unfriendly “Chindia.”
Washington should support India’s membership in the
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SCO, allowing India to advance its regional presence,
check China’s rise, and boost interregional reconnection. A security framework of cooperation promoted
by and involving India and China would allow for a
sustainable evolution of different parts of the rapidly
developing and developed Asia. In the process, the
U.S. military should focus on promoting the idea of
and helping design shared security and military arrangements and responses to regional and/or domestic crises in Central Asia in an institutional setting.
The U.S. military should consider ways of cooperating with the SCO in areas such as counterterrorism,
counternarcotics, border management, and the fight
against cross-border militancy. Provided India becomes a member of the SCO, the U.S. military should
work with Indian military to advance related objectives, while promoting a shared approach to security
management and discoursing competitive dynamics
that are prone to conflict.
Exploiting Grand Strategies and Regional
Connectivity Initiatives.
Advance India’s Role in Grand Strategies
of Central Asian Republics.
Central Asian states view the role of outside powers as crucial in their grand strategies. Currently, India does not feature prominently in these strategies,
but Washington and Delhi can address this deficiency
by advancing the role of India as a future great power.
In the process, they should emphasize to the regional
states the importance of developing the southern vector of connectivity by advancing strategic ties with
India, while pointing to a possible U.S.-Indian part-

76

nership in facilitating this dynamic. As part of the U.S.
strategy, the U.S. military should promote the geopolitical role of India and the United States in the military doctrines of the regional states as a component
of their grand strategies; leverage India’s unimposing
regional posture and counterterrorism capabilities
to advance military ties with the republics; develop
security arrangements to safeguard infrastructure of
transregional projects with participation of Central
Asian states, Afghanistan and, under the right conditions, Iran; identify and help address security vulnerabilities of individual republics as part of bilateral and
multilateral military collaboration, including through
intelligence sharing and arms sales/transfers; increase the frequency of counterterrorism and disaster
relief military exercises; and increase the quota of students and scholarships for Central Asian students in
U.S. and Indian military academies. Pursued together,
these efforts would reinforce the message that the regional states have options to pursue strategic engagement with distant actors, as well.
Align and Combine Parts of U.S. NSRS with India’s
“Connect” Policy.
Both the NSRS and the “connect” policy share
similar objectives, but neither one is solely capable of
achieving its objectives faster, more efficiently, and
in a more sustainable manner. Aligning, combining,
and jointly pursuing components of the two initiatives would generate policy synergies and achieve
outcomes faster and more effectively. India and the
United States could combine the U.S. “software” with
Indian “hardware” or vice-versa dependent on a project. U.S. institutional and trade facilitation expertise
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in combination with infrastructure development and
investments by India would help complete a CentralSouth Asian economic bridge faster. Besides other
benefits, doing so would enhance the symbolism of India and the United States working together and demonstrate the commitment of both powers to regional
economic development and security after 2016 when
Washington and its allies plan to withdraw from Afghanistan. But closer U.S. economic engagement with
its prospective partners would require a new role for
the U.S., Indian, Afghan, and Central Asian militaries
in safeguarding their interests. As part of its militaryto-military engagement with its regional counterparts,
the U.S. military should facilitate security conditions
conducive for effective and uninterrupted functioning
of cross-regional projects and initiatives, such as TAPI,
CASA-1000, and other existing and potential initiatives being advanced by the parties in the broader
region. It should develop security arrangements and
contingencies for engaging individual, joint, or combined military and security forces to safeguard these
assets, especially during regional crises or armed
conflicts threatening this infrastructure.
Channel China’s “Belt” and Other Connectivity
Initiatives in South-West Direction.
China’s “belt” initiative is primarily an east-west
corridor via Central Asia. And while the CPEC facilitates a south-north connection, it does not involve
Central Asian states or India. Washington and Delhi
should advance the participation of Afghanistan, India, the United States, and Central Asian republics in
China’s “belt,” potential expansion of the CPEC, and
other connectivity projects to foster east-southwest
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and south-northwest linkages. Washington and Delhi
should focus on positioning Kashmir and Xingjian as
energy, trade, and transit connectors and shape their
evolution in conjunction with tasks seeking the resolution of border disputes and relaxation of tensions in
the region. Such an approach would create openings
for the United States, India, Afghanistan, and Central
Asian states to develop north-south and south-north
linkages in addition to east-west and west-east connections and do so in collaboration with China and
Pakistan. As such U.S.-Indian engagement in transregional projects grows, and given the conflict potential
of the areas where these projects operate, the U.S. and
Indian militaries should synch their views and practices to advance security and stability in the region.
They should also work with their counterparts in
China and Pakistan to mitigate any suspicions associated with the growing U.S.-Indian economic and military engagement in the region and, ideally, advance
common understanding and shared security arrangements. Focusing on counterterrorism as a first step
could be the best platform for deepening military-tomilitary engagement, as all four actors share a history
of struggle against terrorism.
Facilitate the INSTC Linking Russia and India
via Central Asia.
As Russia pulls Central Asia north and China pulls
it east, it is imperative that India and the United States
ensure that their connectivity strategies open up new
vectors of economic development, military engagement, and strategic collaboration for Central Asian republics without imposing them or denying the republics a choice of pursuing linkages in other directions.

79

Washington and Delhi should facilitate and expand
the INSTC, necessarily linking the EEU, Russia, and
India via the Caspian region and Central Asia. This
would help develop a vertical line in Eurasia strong
enough to approximate, if not match, the horizontal
line of rapidly expanding east-west economic linkages. Otherwise, the balance of forces in Eurasia will rest
on a skewed axis, constraining strategic options for regional economies and external players alike. To assist
the overall U.S. goals of advancing transcontinental
connectivity, the U.S. military should work with its
partners in NATO, Russia, India, and Central Asia to
advance security of the areas where INSTC would operate in its existing and expanded format. In the northern tier of the INSTC, the U.S. military effort should
concentrate on the task, seeking to mitigate interstate
tensions in the region stemming from the unresolved
status of the Caspian. In the southern tier, it should
work with its regional counterparts to reduce security
threats, such as cross-border militancy, transnational
terrorism, and narcotics and human trafficking, which
threaten the economic flows generated by the INSTC.
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V: INDIA’S LONG-TERM PRESENCE
IN CENTRAL ASIA:
FROM ASPIRATIONS TO INFLUENCE
From the 16th to the 18th century, India and Central
Asia interacted as part of an “interimperial system”
that involved the Ottoman, the Mughal, the Safavid,
and the Shaibanid empires. A common “Persianate
code of conduct” going beyond religious affiliations
defined interimperial communication and diplomacy,
linking the empires. But the Great Game, the Russian
revolution, the creation of the Soviet Union, the fall
of the Ottoman Empire, and the de-Persianization of
India have made the borders between empires less
permeable.108 Even the end of the Cold War and the
emergence of independent Central Asian states made
this interaction difficult, as the newly independent
countries cautiously embarked on their quest for a
place on the political map.
But a quarter of a century afterward, Central Asia
is opening up, albeit still slowly, assuming a growing
strategic importance for neighbors and the rest of the
world. India, which had more or less interacted with
the region until the creation of the Soviet Union, has
become increasingly engaged in Central Asia over the
years. But unlike Russia, which has been projecting its
influence in and out of the region for a century and
a half, India is a latecomer to the region’s 21st century “Great Game.” And unlike China, it is starting
its great power ascendance from a lower base and at a
slower pace, explaining its policy failures globally and
in Central-South Asia.
Select elements of India’s strategic culture and
geopolitical constraints account for its delayed arrival and limited presence in Central Asia compared
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to great and middle-ranked powers alike. At the same
time, a number of attributes make it a major partner for the regional states in the long run, capable of
standing up to a potential regional hegemon—China.
While Delhi may choose to rely on its own resources
to advance its strategic position in Central Asia on par
with Russia, China, or the United States, it is far better
off partnering with Washington on a strategic level,
given constraints of its strategic culture and geopolitical challenges it confronts. Without collaboration with
the United States, its strategic positioning in Central
Asia and the world will be slower, while its efforts
to turn its regional aspirations into influence will be
severely constrained.
Ever since it officially shed the principle of nonalignment in its foreign policy after the collapse of the
Soviet Union, India has failed to define its role for the
region or the world as an aspiring great power or serve
as a model of development. As a result, it has no clear
direction to pursue and no appealing model to offer
to its neighbors, including in Central Asia where the
regional republics look more to Russia and China for
guidance and assistance on economic, security, and
development matters. Nor has it yet fully embraced
the concept of national interests as the guiding principle of its policy, even if one could justify the importance of nonalignment in advancing its perceived national interests during and after the Cold War. Unlike
the United States or China, India has no allies. But its
efforts at cultivating such a relation with Vietnam109 is
a promising sign that Delhi should replicate in Central
Asia, where Tajikistan and Kazakhstan could serve
such roles on the southernmost and northernmost
points of Central Asia.
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India’s lack of success in advancing its presence
in Central Asia is not the result of its own failures
alone. Its “Connect Central Asia” policy confronts
a disconnected broader region of Central and South
Asia, whose subregions lack connectivity within and
between each other and witness ethnic tensions and
rivalries for primacy among constituent states. Unlike
Russia or China, India does not border Central Asia,
having to rely on airlifts from Delhi and Dubai, volatile Afghanistan, and relatively isolated Iran to trade
with the region. It also faces an unstable Afghanistan
and unfriendly Pakistan, whose evolution is key to its
regional ambitions. Meanwhile, its tensions with Islamabad and Beijing further limit its reach in Central
Asia. As a result, Delhi is confined to South Asia, unable to unleash its potential as an aspiring great power.
As India’s rival for global primacy and resources,
the rising China presents a formidable strategic challenge to India. This challenge is especially pronounced
in India’s immediate neighborhoods of Central and
South Asia, where Beijing has been making increasingly successful, far-reaching strides. China’s head
start in economic reforms and its already strongest
position in Central Asia have contributed to its relatively stronger geopolitical and geo-economic position in Central Asia, reinforcing Delhi’s perception of
Beijing’s intent to encircle India, tie it down in South
Asia, and prevent it from enhancing its presence in
Central Asia. This has prompted India to counter
China’s moves in an attempt to retain its position, including in Central and South Asia, where it has been
bolstering its partnerships with regional countries.
But the challenge presented by China is not just that
of rivalry for resources and influence. It is also one of
finding political will to cultivate a collaborative com-
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petition between the two rising powers. India should
thus partner with Beijing where possible to advance
its regional position.
India’s failures attributed to its strategic culture,
geopolitical constraints, and rivalries of local and external powers within Central and South Asia require
Delhi to enhance its effort to connect with the region—
something it has yet to achieve as part of its “connect”
policy. Launched in 2012, the policy has sought to
link Central and South Asia by focusing on the development and integration of Afghanistan from within
and without, thereby opening new doors for India to
import strategically vital resources for its resourcehungry economy and to project its rapidly growing
power not only out of South Asia but also Central
Asia. India’s “connect” policy is a reflection of both
geopolitical constraints it confronts and geopolitical
solutions it employs to overcome these constraints
and extend its reach. Despite its proactive stance and
focus on action rather than observation, the “connect”
policy has a long way to go before it delivers. In large
part, this has to do with instability in Afghanistan and
Pakistan—the countries on which India relies to fully
connect with Central Asia and that teeter on the brink
of potential disintegration.
India’s “connect” policy also has to contend with
relatively less constrained policies of other actors in
Central Asia, big and small. The attained presence
of these actors, especially Russia and China, but also
Turkey and individual EEU members, make Delhi’s
desired regional goals look more like aspirations and
ambitions rather than attainable gains and real prospects. To advance its presence in Central Asia, India
can and should capitalize on favorable views of the
regional republics and areas of potential engagement
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that exist between them, especially in energy, weapons procurement and defense, transit infrastructure
development, and trade facilitation. It should also engage rather than shun its perceived rivals. Doing so
would advance development in and between Central
and South Asia, helping it unlock its strategic potential and enabling the regional republics to develop a
southern vector of development and build their external balancing capacity. While a latecomer in the region, India is not unwelcomed by Central Asian states
that are eager to diversify their ties and secure access
to the Indian subcontinent and Indian Ocean.
But this approach is not enough, considering India’s lost ground since the collapse of the Soviet
Union. A search for allies and partners is a strategic
imperative for India—a task bordering on a feat, as
India is yet to discard the legacy and policy inertia of
its nonalignment ideology and embrace the national
interest as the guiding principle of an active rather
than passive foreign policy. While Delhi should strive
for cooperation with its current and long-term rivals
and challengers such as Pakistan and China, it should
develop a weighty strategic partnership with the
United States. As the world’s strongest power with a
democratic system and limited role in Central Asia,
Washington is a natural partner for Delhi in a region
dominated by authoritarian Russia and China. India’s
lack of imperial history, democratic tradition, history
of nonalignment, and shared concern about China’s
emergence make Delhi a prospective partner for the
Unites States globally and regionally. Joining forces in
Central Asia would allow both to advance and sustain
their long-term regional positions vis-à-vis other powers. This is critical because both enjoy limited presence in Central-South Asia, pursue similar agendas,
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and confront similar global and regional threats posed
by state and nonstate actors. As they consider such a
prospect, they should unlock and leverage India’s regional potential by pursuing the following objectives,
which should also uncover the U.S. strategic potential
in Central-South Asia.
First, the United States and India should work together to mitigate security challenges in the Af-Pak
region by focusing on development, reconstruction,
and integration of Afghanistan into the broader region and by encouraging Pakistan to clamp down on
homegrown militant and terrorist groups. This objective rests on the execution of a number of following
tasks, allowing India to connect with Central Asia
more safely, efficiently, and in a sustainable manner:
supporting and expanding India’s reconstruction and
involvement effort in Afghanistan; encouraging AfPak-Indo economic cooperation and relaxation of political tensions; facilitating resolution of the conflict in
Kashmir; and advancing India’s profile in Tajikistan,
which borders Pakistan and China and could serve as
Central-Asia’s receiving end of interregional reconnection.
Second, the United States and India should shape
Iran’s geopolitical role in the world and Central-South
Asia provided Washington and Tehran conclude a nuclear deal and work toward a détente. In the process,
they should encourage Iran to play a role of regional
balancer vis-à-vis Turkey in the Middle East and China and Russia in Central Asia, which would welcome
India’s growing presence in the Iranian economy
dominated by China and facilitate India’s strategic
presence in Eurasia. They should further advance
Indo-Iranian energy, trade, and transit cooperation
with a focus on involvement of Central Asian states
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and Afghanistan, in part by implementing the longoverdue IPI project and encouraging Iran’s participation in resource deliveries from Turkmenistan and the
Caspian to Pakistan and India. Moreover, they should
encourage Indo-Iranian cooperation in rebuilding and
integrating Afghanistan from within and with Central-South Asia, especially given the potential of the
country’s disintegration after 2016.
Third, while Washington and Delhi pursue coengagement with China, they should not lose sight of
the task to foster Sino-Indian cooperation to ensure a
smooth reconnection of Central and South Asia and a
peaceful global environment conducive for unlocking
India’s long-term potential in the world and the broader region. Harnessing and channeling China’s rapid
push into Eurasia is critical for interests of both the
United States and India, given Washington’s declining global profile and Delhi’s growing but constrained
global role. To that purpose, the United States and India should advance the resolution of Sino-Indian border disputes; facilitate the pursuit of joint and shared
Sino-Indian resource acquisition strategies, especially
in the immediate neighborhoods of Central and South
Asia; and stimulate confidence-building measures and
shared security approaches, including by supporting
India’s membership in the Beijing-led SCO.
Finally, the United States and India should not
only imbue their connectivity initiatives with muchneeded commitment, funding, and leadership, but
they should also exploit grand strategies and connectivity initiatives of other powers to facilitate Eurasian internal and external integration with the global
economy, while opening up opportunities for India’s
south-north economic push. To achieve this, Washington and Delhi should advance India’s role in grand

87

strategies of Central Asian republics by highlighting
concerns centered on the rise of China and the benefits
of a strategic U.S.-Indian partnership for the region.
They should also align parts of their connectivity initiatives to achieve faster and more effective regional
outcomes. They would further benefit from channeling China’s “belt” and other connectivity initiatives in
southward and south-northeast directions. Finally, the
parties would do well to facilitate north-south trade
and transit linkages, including as part of an expanded
INSTC already linking Russia, the EEU, and India,
that should involve Central Asian countries, as well as
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Whether India will rely on its own resources—to
be expanded with the rise of its economy—or seek a
partnership with the United States, or both, remains
to be seen. What is clear is that India’s geopolitical
role is set to expand considerably in the years and
decades ahead. Such expansion will generate concerns for neighbors and distant actors alike, creating
conditions for instability despite any benefits of cooperation between them and India as one of the largest economies. Washington and Delhi should ensure
they stay engaged in Central Asia and enhance their
positions amid a power struggle unfolding between
outside powers in this increasingly critical part of the
world. To do this, they should cultivate a strategic
partnership that makes Central Asia its major pillar.
Until then, neither Delhi nor Washington is likely to
succeed.
The role of the U.S. military in the process, either
as part of the U.S.-Indian strategic partnership or as
part of U.S. overall efforts to cultivate such a partnership with Delhi, will be critical. Rightly so, because a
lot is at stake for the United States in this seemingly
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remote backwater. As an area of growing external rivalries, the region of Central-South Asia is a source of
both traditional and nontraditional security threats to
U.S. national interests, be that in the political, military,
or even economic domain. From interstate conflicts to
transnational terrorism and from Russia’s attempts
to reestablish geopolitical control to China’s efforts
to achieve economic dominance, the region is a focal
point of intersecting challenges and opportunities that
the U.S. military should be better positioned to address and leverage in support of U.S. interests. Pursuing those objectives as part of U.S. economic, political,
and military efforts would assist India in unlocking
its regional strategic potential and help Washington
unlock its own.
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